Joint Strike Fighter, F-35

⚔ Det fælles kampfly eller de fælles kampfly fordi der er flere varianter af flyet, aktuelt under udvikling.
The Joint Strike Fighter, or Joint Strike Fighters, because there are several variants of the aircraft currently under development.
Projektbeskrivelse
Er det militært, er det dyrt.
Is it militarily, it is expensive.
'The largest procurement program in the Department of Defense (DOD), the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lightning II, is a strike fighter aircraft being procured in different versions for the United States Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. Current DOD plans call for acquiring a total of 2,457 JSFs. Hundreds of additional F-35s are expected to be purchased by several U.S. allies, eight of which are cost-sharing partners in the program.
The F-35 promises significant advances in military capability. Like many high-technology programs before it, reaching that capability has put the program above its original budget and behind the planned schedule.
The Administration’s proposed FY2015 defense budget requested about $7.8 billion in procurement funding for the F-35 JSF program. This would fund the procurement of 26 F-35As for the Air Force, 6 F-35Bs for the Marine Corps, 2 F-35Cs for the Navy, and continuing development.
FY2014 defense authorization act: The FY2014 defense authorization bill funded F-35 procurement at $5.4 billion for 29 aircraft (19 F-35As, 6 F-35Bs, and 4 F-35Cs, as requested), plus $561.7 million in advance procurement. The conference report accompanying the bill included language repealing some previously enacted reporting requirements for the F-35 program, and mandated a review of F-35 software development.
FY2014 defense appropriations bill: The final omnibus budget bill funded F-35 procurement at $5.1 billion for 29 aircraft (19 F-35As, 6 F-35Bs, and 4 F-35Cs, as requested), plus $521.7 million in advance procurement, a reduction in 3 aircraft from the Administration’s advance procurement request.'
CRS: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program. / : Jeremiah Gertler, 2014.
Fabrikkerne
Flyet er et amerikansk/britisk jagerfly udviklet hos våbenfabrikkerne Lockheed Martin og General Dynamics i samarbejde med fabrikker i Australien, Danmark, Holland, Italien, Kina, Norge, Storbritannien og Tyrkiet.
'This study identifies 138 major F-35 contractors operating in 231 separate locations. Well over half of the contractors identified – 88 – were foreign companies conducting F-35 work outside of the United States. This does not necessarily indicate that a majority of the work on the plane is being done overseas, but it does suggest substantial outsourcing of F-35 work (for details see appendix tables 3 and 4). Countries with the most identified production sites include Italy (36), Australia (30), the United Kingdom (24) and Turkey (12). The United Kingdom is the largest participant in terms of sheer amount of production, but the work is concentrated in fewer sites than in some other countries mentioned.
There is also evidence indicating that Northrop Grumman and Honeywell have used or produced F-35 components in China – including specialized magnets and sensor components – in violation of U.S. laws banning the use of Chinese parts in U.S. defense equipment. The companies assert that they have stopped using Chinese parts, but this issue will bear watching as production of the F-35 moves forward.'
Promising the Sky: Pork Barrel Politics and the F-35 Combat Aircraft. / : William D. Hartung.
- Washington, DC : Center for International Policy, 2014.
Kvalitetsvurderinger
'From mid-2012 until early 2013, the DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) performed a quality management system evaluation of the F-35 Program at Lockheed Martin and its major subcontractors. This evaluation resulted in 363 nonconformities to the A S9100 standard. Eighty-seven of these nonconformities were written against Lockheed Martin; 63 were documented at Lockheed Martin, Fort Worth, Texas and 24 were documented at its subcontractor sites. The remaining 276 nonconformities documented during our previous evaluation were written against Northrop Grumman; BAE; Honeywell Aerospace; L-3 Display Systems; and United Technologies Corporation, Aerospace Systems (UTAS), and were not included in this evaluation. All nonconformities were categorized as major, minor, or an opportunity for improvement (OFI), in accordance with AS9101, “Quality Management Systems – Audit Requirements for Aviation, Space, and Defense Organizations.” Of the 63 nonconformities that were directed to Lockheed Martin at its Fort Worth, Texas, facility, 23 were categorized as major and 40 were categorized as minor
Current F-35 Program Quality Management Performance
Results of AS9100 Conformance Inspection at Lockheed Martin, Fort Worth, Texas Our inspection at Lockheed Martin, Fort Worth, Texas from late September 2014 through early October 2014 resulted in 61 nonconformities that identified weaknesses in the F-35 Program's implementation of the AS9100 quality management system. Of these, 52 were written against Lockheed Martin and were categorized as 24 major, 26 minor, and 2 OFIs. Four nonconformities were written against JPO: two major and two OFIs. In addition, five were written against DCMA: one major and four minor.'
F-35 Lightning II Program Quality Assurance and Corrective Action Evaluation. / : Inspector General U.S. Department of Defense, 2015.
Oprindelig budget omkring 300 mia dollar. I 2013 var udgifterne steget til 323 mia dollar i faste 2012 priser. De første fly forventes i produktion omkring 2012 og de forventes operationelle 2016-2017.
Pris pr. fly 2004 anslået til 45.2 millioner dollar. Efterfølgende er salgsprisen pr. stk. mangedoblet.
Lande, der har forudbestilt kampflyet:
Australien, Canada, Danmark, Holland, Israel, Italien, Japan, Norge, Storbritannien, Sydkorea, Tyrkiet og USA.
Problemer:
Atomvåben, beslutningsgrundlaget, priser, prisstigninger, luft- og støjforurening samt flysikkerhed og software.
Atomvåben
Europæiske Joint Strike Fighters skal kunne medføre taktiske atomvåben.
'In addition to increasing the capability of the bombs in Europe, some of the delivery vehicles are also slated for a significant modernization. The F-35 Lightning II, also known as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), will replace the F-16 as carrier of the B61 nuclear bomb. The F-35 has significantly greater capabilities than the F-16, including stealth. Each F-35 will be able to carry two B61-12s internally. Delivery was initially scheduled to begin in 2014, but the NPR delayed it to 2017. Due to delays caused by budget constraints and development issues, the Air Force now “intends to deliver nuclear capability to all JSFs in Europe in the 2020 time frame via the Block IV upgrade.'
Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons. / : Hans M. Kristensen. Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No 3, May 2012 s. 27.
Tre af de stater der har bestilt kampflyet er i besiddelse af kernevåben: Israel, Storbritannien og USA.
Storbritannien har kun atomvåben placeret på ubåde.
Beslutningsgrundlaget
Oplysninger om Joint Strike Fighter er stadig klassificeret eller maskeret.
Manglende sikkerhedspolitisk debat om kampflyenes fremtidige nytte og anvendelse, samt, manglende debat om eventuelle forsvarpolitiske alternativer. Og der er også en manglende økonomisk debat. Har vi råd til flyene?
Er der overhovedet brug for et dansk luftvåben fremover? Den sikkerhedspolitiske situation i den sidste generation har jo vist, at der ikke var brug for danske ubåde, så som Sælen. Er droner et reelt alternativ til kampfly?
Canadiske embedsmænds beslutningsgrundlag var yderst kritisabel
'There were significant weaknesses in the decision-making process used by National Defence in acquiring the F-35 to replace the CF-18. By the end of 2006, the Department was actively involved in developing the F-35, and a number of activities had put in motion its eventual procurement. In the lead-up to the government’s 2010 announcement, required documents were prepared and key steps were taken out of sequence. Key decisions were made without required approvals or supporting documentation.'
Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons Spring 2012: Chapter 2: Replacing Canada’s Fighter Jets
Priser og økonomi
Noget usædvanligt er stykprisen på kampflyene afhængig af, hvor mange der bliver solgt og hvor store udviklingsomkostningerne i det lange løb er. Den politiske beslutningsproces i de forskellige lande der er med i projektet er meget forskellige. Canadiske politikere overvejer om de overhovedet vil være med. Hollænderne har sænket deres forhåndsbestillinger fra 85 til 37 og amerikanerne har givet afkald på tre fly.
De fleste økonomiske analyser af kampflyprojekterne med et tidsperspektiv frem til 2030 eller senere, er alle udarbejdet af den amerikanske rigsrevision, United States Government Accountability Office, eksempelvis:.
'The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program had to make unexpected changes to its development and test plans over the last year, largely in response to a structural failure on a durability test aircraft, an engine failure, and software challenges. At the same time, engine reliability is poor and has a long way to go to meet program goals. With nearly 2 years and 40 percent of developmental testing to go, more technical problems are likely.
Addressing new problems and improving engine reliability may require additional design changes and retrofits. Meanwhile, the Department of Defense (DOD) has plans to increase annual aircraft procurement from 38 to 90 over the next 5 years. As GAO has previously reported, increasing production while concurrently developing and testing creates risk and could result in additional cost growth and schedule delays in the future.
Cost and affordability challenges remain. DOD plans to significantly increase annual F-35 funding from around $8 billion to nearly $12 billion over the next 5 years reaching $14 billion in 2022 and remaining between $14 and $15 billion for nearly a decade. Over the last year, DOD reduced near-term aircraft procurement by 4 aircraft, largely due to budget constraints. While these deferrals may lower annual near-term funding needs, they will likely increase the cost of aircraft procured in that time frame and may increase funding liability in the future. It is unlikely the program will be able to sustain such a high level of annual funding and if required funding levels are not reached, the program’s procurement plan may not be affordable. DOD policy requires affordability analyses to inform long-term investment decisions. The consistent changes in F-35 procurement plans indicate that DOD’s prior analyses did not adequately account for future technical and funding uncertainty.'
GAO: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: Assessment Needed to Address Affordability Challenges, 2015.
Det seneste amerikanske luftvåben budget anslår, en enhedsomkostning for en fabriksklar F-35A er US 92,3 millioner dollars (i faste 2014 dollars) i 2018. Altså 605.1188 millioner kroner pr. stk. efter dagens aktuelle valutakurser. I omegnen af 17 milliarder + det løse, for de 27 fly den danske regering agter at bestille. Forsvarsministeriet meddeler i Kampfly - Regeringens indstilling, at, 'Finansieringsbehovet ved 27 JSF fly i perioden 2021-2026 udgør i størrelsesordenen 20 mia. kr., samt at, '[s]tørstedelen af finansieringen sker ved anvendelse af råderum under materielplanen. Råderum under materielplanen 2018-2026 udgør ca. 13,4 mia. kr., jf. figur 1. Derudover fremrykkes 0,9 mia. kr. af råderummet under materielplanen fra 2027.'
Dog, URF-priser pr. stel i Typevalg af danmarks kommende kampfly, er klassiciceret.
URF-priserne er ifølge ministeriets rapport, 'Unit Recurring Flyaway Cost (URF-pris). URF-prisen angiver prisen for ét fly i basiskonfiguration inkl. motor, men uden støtteudstyr, missionsspecifikt udstyr, reservedele med videre.' Hemmeligholdelsen af prisen på de fabriksnye fly antyder dog i det mindste på, at ministeriet er i besiddelse af en prisliste.
Resten er mere eller mindre seriøse gætterier.
Ifølge Politiken er den forventet pris for de 27 kampfly 570 millioner kroner stykket. "Det vurderes, at hvert kampfly kan komme til at koste omkring 1 milliard i indkøbspris, hvilket vil sige 27 milliarder i alt. Samlet set kan prisen ende på over 100 milliarder kroner, når drift og vedligeholdelse tælles med", skriver Enhedslisten. Totalomkostningerne er i alt 56,4 milliarder for nye kampfly, oplyser forsvarsminister Peter Christensen, ifølge Informations referat. 12. maj 2016. .
Selv ikke i USA har politikerne etableret faste rammer for våbenindkøb over længere årrækker.
CRS: Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress. / : Ronald O'Rourke, Moshe Schwartz, 2016
Også dele af projektets økonomi er klassificeret eller maskeret.
'The original planning assumption of 150 aircraft is not expected to be realised.54 In July 2012 the Government has committed to 48 aircraft but has refused to be drawn on the total number of aircraft it expects to order.
The Government has refused to be drawn on the likely overall total cost, citing concerns about protecting the department’s commercial negotiations. Defence Equipment Minister Philip Dunne has said that while the MOD has a detailed through-life cost estimate for the programme which forecasts all Main Gates, it is withholding that information because disclosure would prejudice commercial interests.68 In 2003 the Government estimated Government estimated the procurement cost of the JSF programme to be up to £10 billion, dependent on the number of aircraft acquired and support costs.'
The UK's F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. / : Louisa Brooke-Holland. House of Commons Library, Standard Note: SN06278, 2015.
'The F-35 has been on political life support for the last four years, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Pentagon acquisition bureaucrats investing much effort in convincing the White House, Congress and participant Allied nations that the project is an icon of virtue in the current pantheon of failed major acquisitions. While former procurement Czar John Young went as far as to criticise the program's prior management history, he was not prepared to admit the obvious, which is that the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter now qualifies in all key respects as what project management professionals term a “non-executable project”.'
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Program: Collapse is a “When” Question, not an “If” Question. / : Carlo Kopp, Peter Goon. Air Power Australia NOTAM, 17th August, 2009
Miljøvurderinger
Den amerikanske hærs ingeniørkorps har udarbejdet en operationel erklæring om F-35As grundlæggende virkninger på miljøet i 2013. En diger rapport på over 900 s. Af denne rapport fremgår det, at:
'Beddown of the F-35A would change noise conditions and the type of land uses affected by aircraft noise at all alternative locations. At Burlington AGS and Mountain Home AFB, noise levels of 65 dB DNL or greater would affect a larger area than currently found under baseline conditions under any alternative scenario. At Hill AFB, the area affected by noise levels of 65 dB DNL or greater would decrease under ACC Scenarios 1 and 2, but increase slightly under ACC Scenario 3. For Jacksonville AGS and McEntire JNGB, the affected areas would decrease substantially in both scenarios. For Shaw AFB, the affected area for 65 dB DNL and greater noise levels would decrease in ACC Scenario 1, but increase in the other two scenarios. Effects on land uses in the vicinity of the bases vary depending upon location and scenario; with the exception of Burlington AGS and ACC Scenario 3 at Hill AFB, effects on residential lands would decrease or remain the same. Construction costs at the alternative locations under all scenarios would range from $0.4M to $51.9M.'
'Thus, it is conceivable that aircraft noise is more damaging than road traffic noise for children’s cognition.'
Burden of disease from environmental noise: Quantification of healthy life years lost in Europe.
- Copenhagen : The WHO European Centre for Environment and Health, Bonn Office, WHO Regional Office for Europe, 2011.
Software
'The Department of Defense (DOD) is aware of risks that could affect the F-35’s Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), but does not have a plan to ensure that ALIS is fully functional...
ALIS may not be deployable: ALIS requires server connectivity and the necessary infrastructure to provide power to the system. The Marine Corps, which often deploys to austere locations, declared in July 2015 its ability to operate and deploy the F-35 without conducting deployability tests of ALIS. A newer version of ALIS was put into operation in the summer of 2015, but DOD has not yet completed comprehensive deployability tests. ALIS does not have redundant infrastructure: ALIS’s current design results in all F-35 data produced across the U.S. fleet to be routed to a Central Point of Entry and then to ALIS’s main operating unit with no backup system or redundancy. If either of these fail, it could take the entire F-35 fleet offline.'
GAO: F-35 Sustainment: DOD Needs a Plan to Address Risks Related to Its Central Logistics System, 2016.
Det befæstede fattighus
Militære indkøb i Danmark
II. Tilrettelæggelsen af større materielanskaffelser
'2. Forsvarets større materielanskaffelser er underlagt Forsvarets Materieltjenestes ansvar. Materieltjenesten blev oprettet den 1. januar 2007 på baggrund af forsvarsforliget 2005-2009 vedrørende etableringen af forsvarets funktionelle tjenester. Materieltjenesten ligger under Forsvarskommandoens ansvarsområde. Chefen for Materieltjenesten rapporterer ligeledes til Forsvarsministeriet.'
Rigsrevisionen: Notat til Statsrevisorerne om tilrettelæggelsen af en eventuel større undersøgelse af forsvarets materielanskaffelser, 2008.
- http://www.rigsrevisionen.dk/media/1880403/a508-08.pdf
Organisatorisk er indkøb i forsvaret spredt over flere myndigheder, hvoraf Forsvarets Materieltjeneste (FMT) og Forsvarets Bygnings- og Etablissementstjeneste (FBE) foretager hovedparten af forsvarets indkøb med henholdsvis 4,2 mia. kr. og 1,6 mia. kr. i 2010, mens andre myndigheder, herunder de tre værn og Forsvarets Koncernfælles Informatiktjeneste (FKIT), foretager det resterende indkøb.
Effektiviseringer og bedre økonomistyring - Afrapportering af budgetanalyser af forsvaret. Forsvarsministeriet: Udvalget for analyser af forsvaret, 2012.
Kampflykontoret, programkontor under Forsvarsministeriet: Nyt Kampfly Program
Til at forberede beslutningsgrundlaget for anskaffelsen af nye kampfly blev Nyt Kampfly Program oprettet i marts 2013. Nyt Kampfly Program er en integreret del af Forsvarsministeriets departement og har blandt andet haft til opgave at evaluere de tre kampflykandidater inden for fire grundlæggende områder: strategiske, militære, økonomiske og industrielle forhold.
Den samlede danske regning for de 27 kampfly anslås aktuelt i 2016 til at løbe op i 56,4 milliarder kr. altså to milliarder kr. pr. stk.
Forsvarets forbrug på indkøb var i 2010 ca. 7 mia. kr., hvilket svarer til godt 1/3 af forsvarets samlede årlige udgifter på ca. 21 mia. kr. Den samlede pris for kampflyene svarer altså til de samlede danske forsvarsudgifter i 2 ½ år. Isoleret for materielanskaffelsesbugettet svarer det til det samlede budget i otte år. Skal der også være lidt midler med uændrede forsvarsudgifter til de andre værn, nye lastbiler og til bygningsvedligeholdelse, er kampflyende nok betalt færdigt om mellem 56 og 150 år, hvis de nuværende budgetter holder. Venstre mindretalsregeringen binder med andre ord de to næste generationer af danskere til at acceptere og videreføre partiets forsvarspolitik.
Danmark har forudbestillingsoption på 48 fly.
Statsministeriet: Pressemøde om kampfly, 11.05.16
Statsminister Lars Løkke Rasmussen og forsvarsminister Peter Christensen vil torsdag præsentere regeringens udspil til anskaffelse af nye kampfly, der skal erstatte de eksisterende F16-fly.
Regeringens udspil sker som opfølgning på forsvarsaftalen 2013-2017.
Dansk deltagelse i udviklingsarbejdet skyldes et initiativ fra Terma som fik Forsvarskommandoen, Erhvervsfremmestyrelsen, Dansk Industri og borgerlige politikere til at støtte projektet økonomisk i forsvarsforliget 1999. Politisk enighed mellem forsvarsforligspartierne i marts 2002 om bevilling til financiering af jagerflyet. Memorandum of Understanding mellem Danmark og USA om dansk deltagelse i udviklingen af jagerflyet underskrives 2002. Den samlede pris for den danske deltagelse i udviklingsprojektet holdes hemmeligt. Kendte deltagende danske virksomheder 2003 - 2005: AM3D, Corena, CSC Danmark A/S, Danish Aerotech A/S, DELTA, Falck Schmidt Defence Systems A/S, Force Technology, GateHouse A/S, GPV Group A/S, HiQ WISE A/S, IFAD?, Maersk Data Defence A/S, Printca, Systematic Software Engineering A/S , Terma A/S samt Laboratoriet for akustik ved Aalborg Universitet og RISØ.
Også drift- og vedligeholdelsesudgifter er af gode grunde ukendte.
Kampflypris kan stige 25 procent: Regning på 20 milliarder kroner for F-35-fly kan vokse med en fjerdedel. Det skyldes særligt valutakursen, men også udgifter til køb og drift er usikre. / : Jacob Svendsen, Carl Emil Arnfred. I: Politiken, 14. maj 2016.
Efter 10 års turbulens er der stadig usikkerhed om prisen på F-35. / : Jacob Svendsen, Carl Emil Arnfred. I: Politiken, 14. maj 2016.
Som udvidet PDF.

Litteratur

Aftale om anskaffelse af nye kampfly
København, den 9. juni 2016
Der er mellem regeringen og Socialdemokraterne, Dansk Folkeparti, Liberal Alliance og Radikale Venstre indgået aftale om anskaffelse af nye kampfly til erstatning for de nuværende F-16 fly.
An evaluation of the potential loss in West Valley home values from locating F-35 at Luke Air Force Base.
CRS: F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program : Background, Status, and Issues. 2007.
Det ender med en JFS. / : Charlotte Aagaard. I: Information, 12. maj 2016.
Dreijer, Niels: Teknologi skal tale til instinkterne. I: Ingeniøren, 2004:37 s. 32 og 37.
Et dyrt bekendtskab. / : Charlotte Aagaard ; Lotte Folke Kaarsholm. I: Information, 10/31/2005.
F-35A OPS 1 Record of Decision F-35A OPS 3 Record of Decision
F-35A Operational Basing Environmental Impact Statement Vol I
F-35A Operational Basing Environmental Impact Statement Vol II Appendices A-E.
/ : U.S Army Corps of Engineers, Geotechnical and Environmental Engineering Branch (CESPK-ED-GI)
- http://www.stopthef35.com/wp-content/uploads/FEIS%209-13%20ADA595410.pdf
GAO: F-35 Joint Strike Fighter: DOD's Proposed Follow-on Modernization Acquisition Strategy Reflects an Incremental Approach Although Plans Are Not Yet Finalized
We previously reported that it will cost nearly $400 billion to acquire the F-35 and more than $1 trillion to operate and sustain it. However, DOD's most expensive weapon program could cost more. DOD expects to spend an additional $3.9 billion over the next five years to develop new capabilities to modernize its F-35s
$ 1 billioner er ufatteligt mange ressurcer for drift og vedligeholdelse af et krigsapparat. Desuden ser det ud til at udviklingen af krigsmaskinen ifølge den amerikanske Rigsrevision endnu ikke er færdig.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO): Tactical Aircraft: Status of the F/A-22 and JSF Acquisition Programs and Implications for Tactical Aircraft Modernization. GAO-05-390T, March 3, 2005
- http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-390T
Joint Strike Fighter giver bingo i Washington. / : Charlotte Aagaard. I: Information, 13. maj 2016.
Leder: Frokost i Det hvide Hus. I: Information, 13. maj 2016.
Lindboe, Rasmus: Regeringen får nyt prischok for jagerfly : Forsvarsminister Jens Aage Jensby (V) får ny ekstraregning for omstridt Joint Strike Fighter jagerfly. Oppositionen kræver nu, at regeringen forlader projektet. I: Information, 02/13/2004.
Nyt kampfly vil give ordrer for millioner. / Christian Brøndum ; Bjørn Willum. I: Berlingske Tidende, 06/20/2005.
One Dead Pilot: Single-Engine F-35 a Bad Choice for Canada's Arctic. / : Michael Byers.
- Ottawa : Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2014.
- https://www.policyalternatives.ca/
rtj: Hemmelig aftale om jagerfly. I: Dagbladet Arbejderen, 11/08/2002.
Ritzaus Bureau: Kampfly giver millionordre. 05/02/2003.
SF færdig med forsvarsforlig. / : Kim Kristensen. I: Information, 10. juni 2016.
Det store slag i luften / Bjørn Lambek ; Peter Suppli Benson. I: Politiken, 01/19/2003.

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