Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 13. Oktober 2009 / Time Line October 13, 2009
Version 3.512. Oktober 2009, 14. Oktober 2009
10/13/2009
Another Nobel Controversy
By: Lawrence S.
Wittner
The swirling controversy over President Barack Obama's receipt of
the Nobel Peace Prize brings to mind another controversy that began
in October 1985, when the Norwegian committee announced that that
year's prize would go to International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).
This global physicians' movement was initiated in 1979 by Dr.
Bernard Lown, a prominent American cardiologist deeply concerned
about the spiraling nuclear confrontation between the United States
and the Soviet Union and what it portended for the future.
Approaching the distinguished Soviet cardiologist, Dr. Evgenii
Chazov, with whom he had had previous professional contacts, Lown
sought to convince Chazov that they should build an international
physicians' movement that would alert the world to the nuclear
peril. Chazov was initially reluctant to involve himself in this
venture, for it seemed likely to lead to the sacrifice of the
modern hospital he was building and, worst of all, engage him in
political difficulties with the Soviet authorities. Even so, he
succumbed to Lown's pleas and, in late 1980, a small group of U.S.
and Soviet physicians laid the groundwork for IPPNW, with Lown and
Chazov and co-chairs.
Riding the wave of antinuclear protest during the early 1980s,
IPPNW grew dramatically. By 1985, it had affiliates in 41 nations,
with a membership of 135,000 physicians. Its U.S. affiliate was
Physicians for Social Responsibility, which claimed some 37,000
members. As doctors were figures of considerable prestige, the
reports, conferences, speeches, and lobbying by IPPNW, its
affiliates, and its members on behalf of nuclear disarmament had
considerable credibility and impact. As Chazov feared, he did draw
a sour response from Soviet party conservatives. But he was
shielded from their wrath thanks to his role as the personal
physician to aging and ill Soviet government officials.
In October 1985, when it was announced that IPPNW had been awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize, the status of this global physicians'
movement soared. Irate at this turn of events, conservative parties
and portions of the Western communications media launched a
blistering attack upon it, charging that Chazov and other Soviet
doctors were agents of the Kremlin and that Western doctors were
hopeless dupes. In an editorial headed "The Nobel Peace Fraud," the
Wall Street Journal claimed that the Nobel committee had "hit a new
low." Forbes magazine—which advertised itself as "Capitalist
Tool"—charged that "these medicine men are more eager to
pounce on Uncle Sam than on the Red Bear." It concluded: "The
Norwegian Nobel committee blew it; this year they should've taken a
powder." A headline in the New York Daily News proclaimed "Soviet
Propaganda Wins the Prize," while the Detroit News assailed "Nobel
Lunacies." Chazov, particularly, was charged with everything from
torturing Soviet dissidents to inventing the AIDS virus.
The conservative governments of a number of NATO countries weighed
in against IPPNW, with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl appealing
to the Nobel Committee to rescind the prize. When Jakob Sverdrup,
the secretary of the Nobel Committee, was asked on German national
television if a government had ever before urged that the award be
rescinded, he responded affirmatively. In 1935, he noted, Adolf
Hitler had issued an appeal against giving the award to a German
pacifist, Carl von Ossietzky, then imprisoned in a Nazi
concentration camp. Deeply embarrassed, the West German government
dropped the issue.
IPPNW leaders defended the organization's integrity, but the best
rebuttal occurred at the Nobel ceremonies that December. Lown and
Chazov were doing their best to respond to hostile questions at a
crowded press conference when a Soviet journalist tumbled to the
floor, felled by a cardiac arrest. Immediately, Lown, Chazov, and
other doctors raced to the stricken man's side, taking turns
pounding on his chest and giving him mouth-to-mouth resuscitation.
Ultimately, they saved his life. When the press conference resumed,
Lown, shaken but quick-witted, said: "What you have just seen is a
parable of our movement. When a crisis comes, when life is in
danger, Soviet and American physicians cooperate. . . . We forget
ideology, we forget our differences." And "the big issue
confronting humankind today is sudden nuclear death."
This dramatic incident rallied support for IPPNW, which pressed
forward with its antinuclear campaign—a campaign that made a
significant contribution to subsequent nuclear disarmament treaties
signed by the major powers. By late 1988, IPPNW had grown to a
federation of physicians' groups in 61 countries, with over 200,000
members. It continues its efforts today, as does its U.S.
affiliate, Physicians for Social Responsibility.
With this incident in mind, we should be wary before assailing the
considered judgment of the Nobel Committee today, as it once again
presents an award to a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament.
Indeed, we might ask the conservative critics of awarding the prize
to Barack Obama what
they have done for peace lately. And, if they have done
nothing—or worse—we might well question their
motives.
10/13/2009
Nuclear Noh Drama: Tokyo, Washington and the Case of the Missing
Nuclear Agreements
Washington, DC, October 13, 2009 - The election of the new
Democratic Party government in Japan led by Yukio Hatoyama raises a
significant challenge for the Obama administration: the status of
secret agreements on nuclear weapons that Tokyo and Washington
negotiated in 1960 and 1969. For years, the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party claimed that there were no such agreements,
denying, for example, allegations that they had allowed U.S.
nuclear-armed ships to sail into Japanese ports. Nevertheless,
declassified U.S. government documents, interviews with former U.S.
Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, and memoirs by Japanese diplomats
confirm the existence of the secret understandings.
The basic facts about the agreements have been the subject of
long-standing controversy in Japan, where a post-Hiroshima,
anti-nuclear tradition was at odds with secret understandings
crafted to support the operational requirements of America's Cold
War nuclear deterrent. The Liberal Democrats might have faced a
political disaster if they had acknowledged, as appears to be the
case, that the U.S. Navy's nuclear-armed ships had free access to
Japanese waters.
Seeking to settle the matter, the new Democratic Party government
has launched an internal investigation into the agreements and
their negotiating history. To aid this investigation, the National
Security Archive today posted on the Web the most important U.S.
declassified documents on the issue. Nevertheless, Japan is not
likely to act unilaterally to declassify the 1960 and 1969 nuclear
agreements. The Obama administration should not only assist Japan
so that early declassification of the agreements is possible, but
also declassify the remaining still-secret U.S. documents, allowing
an old controversy to be settled.
The two secret agreements were negotiated during the Cold War, when
the United States Navy routinely transited Pacific waters with
nuclear weapons onboard and the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet
nuclear war was a matter of routine military planning. One of the
agreements was actually a record of discussion that established an
agreed and carefully defined interpretation of U.S. commitments
regarding nuclear weapons, negotiated in 1960, that allowed transit
of nuclear weapons through Japanese territory and waters,
relegating the consultation requirement to the introduction and
basing of nuclear weapons in Japan.
The other was part of the 1969 agreement reverting Okinawa to
Japan: U.S. nuclear weapons on Okinawa would be withdrawn but
re-introduction would be possible in an emergency. Even after the
end of the Cold War, which brought the worldwide withdrawal of all
U.S. theater nuclear weapons, the U.S. government deferred to the
Liberal Democrats on the need to keep the agreements secret, but
that need is clearly now moot. Declassification is possible and
necessary because determining what Tokyo and Washington actually
negotiated is a question of significant historical importance and a
key missing piece in the nuclear history of the Cold War.
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