Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 20. April
2009 / Time Line April 20, 2009
Version 3.0
19. April 2009, 21. April 2009
04/20/2009
How Feasible Is Barack Obama's Nuclear
Disarmament Agenda?
By Lawrence S.
Wittner
Not since Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, decades ago, talked of
abolishing nuclear weapons has an American president pledged to
work toward that goal. Yet, speaking in Prague on April 5, 2009, President Barack Obama
proclaimed "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to
seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear
weapons."
Furthermore, Obama linked his announcement of this lofty aim with a
discussion of specific actions that his administration would take
in 2009. These included signing a new Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) with the Russians—one setting the stage for
further nuclear cutbacks involving all nuclear weapons
states—pursuing U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and negotiating an agreement with Iran to avert
that nation's development of nuclear weapons.
This ambitious nuclear disarmament agenda has a number of things
bolstering it. A START Treaty seems particularly negotiable. At
peace with one another and with upwards of 95 percent of the
world's 26,000 nuclear weapons in their possession, Russia and the
United States have little need for vast, unnecessary Cold War-style
nuclear arsenals. Moscow proposed sharp reductions years ago and,
with even Senate Republicans in favor of U.S.-Russian arms
agreements, Washington now seems ready to accept a new START treaty
that would slash U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to no more than
1,500 nuclear weapons each.
Ratification of a nuclear test ban treaty also has considerable
momentum. Negotiated and signed by President Bill Clinton in 1996,
the CTBT enjoys substantial popularity among the American people
and has already been ratified by such U.S. allies as Britain,
France, and Germany, as well as by numerous other nations,
including Russia. Furthermore, as there has been no U.S. nuclear
testing since 1992, the U.S. government would gain (rather than
lose) by setting up verification procedures to see to it that other
nations, as well, refrained from nuclear tests and, thus, could not
develop nuclear weapons.
Although a non-proliferation agreement with Iran seems less
promising, it too remains feasible. By opening direct negotiations
with Iran, the Obama administration has eased the sharp
U.S.-Iranian confrontation of recent years. In addition, by making
plans to eliminate much of its own nuclear arsenal, the U.S.
government has undercut the sense of grievance that Iran and other
Third World nations feel at a U.S. double standard when it comes to
nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the Iranian
government is developing nuclear weapons or, if it is, that it is
unwilling to stop some steps short of their actual
production—a situation that might prove an acceptable
compromise to both Iran and other nations.
But what about the broad goal of a nuclear-free world? Here, too,
there is some cause for optimism. Even during the election
campaign, Obama spoke and wrote of nuclear abolition, and there is
no reason to assume that he has changed his mind on that score.
Furthermore, the idea of nuclear abolition—long popular with
the general public—has been gaining support in recent years
from political elites, particularly former national security
officials. Even many high-ranking military officers have begun to
wonder about the value of these weapons that they are never able to
use.
Nevertheless, some serious obstacles remain.
NATO's expansion to Russia's borders has angered Russian leaders in
recent decades, and the U.S. plan for installing missile defense
systems in Poland and the Czech Republic has intensified the
chilliness in U.S.-Russian relations. Obama has said that these
antimissile systems are only a response to the threat of an Iranian
nuclear attack and that, if Iran agreed to forgo nuclear weapons,
the systems would be unnecessary. But, at this point, Russian
officials remain very suspicious of U.S. behavior and inclined to
make the conditions of a START treaty dependent on a resolution of
the missile defense issue.
Ratification of the CTBT is even more problematic. With U.S. Senate
ratification of treaties requiring two-thirds support, a determined
minority can kill just about any treaty. This is what happened in
1999, when, in an almost entirely party-line vote, a bloc of
Republican senators defeated CTBT ratification. And it might well
happen again this year. Although Democrats are enthusiastic about
the CTBT, they will need 67 votes to push it through the Senate.
And, thus far, not a single Republican senator has come out in
favor of it.
An agreement by Iran to remain a non-nuclear power also remains
uncertain. For one thing, the Iranian government might not be
willing to stop short of developing nuclear weapons. Or the Israeli
government might act preemptively or push the U.S. government into
adopting a hard line. In addition, the U.S. Congress might demand
concessions on other issues that the Iranian government won't
make.
Finally, nuclear abolition remains far from certain. What if the
U.S. government and others—despite their abolitionist
rhetoric—simply aren't ready for this great a departure from
their past policies? Also, isn't the level of popular mobilization
for antinuclear action rather low by comparison to past periods of
progress in nuclear disarmament? And what would happen to the goal
of nuclear abolition if one or more of these specific
actions—securing a new START treaty, CTBT ratification, and
an agreement with Iran—resulted in failure?
Even so, it appears likely that, in the next few years, at least
some nuclear disarmament efforts will prove fruitful. Moreover, the
failure of one or more of them need not derail the overall movement
toward a nuclear-free world. To avoid this situation, Kevin Martin,
the executive director of Peace Action (the largest peace and
disarmament organization in the United States), has proposed a
leapfrog strategy. In addition to supporting specific disarmament
measures, he has maintained, nuclear disarmament supporters should
champion a U.S. government announcement, made at the nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference of 2010 or before, that
it is initiating multilateral negations for a treaty or convention
to abolish nuclear weapons. After all, there is no reason to delay
negotiation of such a treaty until all of the specific actions have
been taken. Indeed, some might become part of such a treaty.
Overall, then, the United States and other nations are headed once
more toward confronting the nuclear menace. Given the obstacles,
progress might not be rapid. As Obama remarked in Prague, a world
without nuclear weapons "will not be reached quickly. . . . It will
take patience and persistence." But, for the first time in two
decades, a serious effort is being made along these lines. And
results seem likely to follow.
04/20/2009
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