Det danske Fredsakademi

Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 7. Oktober 2005 / Time Line October 7, 2005

Version 3.5

6. Oktober 2005, 8. Oktober 2005

Mohamed ElBaradei

10/07/2005
Modtageren af årets Nobelfredspris offentliggøres:
The Norwegian Nobel Committee
THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE FOR 2005
The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2005 is to be shared, in two equal parts, between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, for their efforts to prevent nuclear energy from being used for military purposes and to ensure that nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is used in the safest possible way.
At a time when the threat of nuclear arms is again increasing, the Norwegian Nobel Committee wishes to underline that this threat must be met through the broadest possible international cooperation.
This principle finds its clearest expression today in the work of the IAEA and its Director General. In the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is the IAEA which controls that nuclear energy is not misused for military purposes, and the Director General has stood out as an unafraid advocate of new measures to strengthen that regime. At a time when disarmament efforts appear deadlocked, when there is a danger that nuclear arms will spread both to states and to terrorist groups, and when nuclear power again appears to be playing an increasingly significant role, IAEA's work is of incalculable importance.
In his will, Alfred Nobel wrote that the Peace Prize should, among other criteria, be awarded to whoever had done most for the "abolition or reduction of standing armies". In its application of this criterion in recent decades, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has concentrated on the struggle to diminish the significance of nuclear arms in international politics, with a view to their abolition. That the world has achieved little in this respect makes active opposition to nuclear arms all the more important today.

Nobelpris til IAEA og El Baradei
- jeg viser til oversendt kommentar (nederst) - og sender her med et avsnitt fra den nye boka, utgitt for to dager siden, onsdag 5. okt 2005
Av Fredrik S. HEFFERMEHL
"Vanunu - hans kamp og kampen for ham.":
Side 259
Hva Israels regjering - og folk - virkelig bør være redd for
Er det et område hvor taushetsplikt og lovregler om statshemmeligheter ikke bør gjelde, så er det i spørsmål som har å gjøre med brudd på atomsikkerhet. Det er nettopp ved denne typen farer at samfunnet har behov for varsling. Atomområdet har det til felles med den militære sektor at det er omgitt av et betydelig vern mot innsyn - og dermed sterkt økt risiko for at svært forkastelige forhold kan utvikle seg.
For meg er det etter hvert blitt en dyp sannhet at mangel på offentlig innsyn og offentlig debatt med sikkerhet får alle slags korrupte og forsømmelige tilbøyeligheter til å blomstre. Dette prøvde jeg - i kjølvannet av den såkalte Nukem-skandalen i Tyskland i 1988 - å gjøre best mulig kjent. Det som der kom frem, kunne få blodet til å fryse i årene på noen hver. Atomavfall fra Tyskland ble fraktet til midlertidig lagring i Frankrike fordi det ikke var lov å lagre tysk avfall i Tyskland. Tyskerne på sin side mottok så midlertidig lagring av fransk atomavfall - altså mye farlig landeveistransport i det minste.
Folk bør kjenne realitetene bak de fine forespeilingene som atomlobbyene gir om en forurensningsfri og ufarlig energikilde. Den praktiske virkeligheten vil atomlobbyen ha minst mulig omtale av. Når det gjelder denne typen sannheter, er Israels trolig intet unntak.
Ikke nok med at Israels politiske ledere forledet sitt folk om Vanunus motiver og begikk et alvorlig overgrep mot ham. Skandalen stopper ikke der. Israelske myndigheter hadde sine helt spesielle grunner da de forsøkte å få løfter av Vanunu om at han aldri skulle fortelle noe mer om sitt arbeid på Dimona. Disse grunnene hadde ikke å gjøre med vern mot fiender. Det dreide seg om den dommen lederne i Israel fryktet fra det israelske folk hvis folket skulle bli fullt informert om hvilken fare det ble påført ved at Dimona ble bygget og drevet.
Det har lenge vært en gåte for meg hvorfor ikke The Sunday Times i 1986 offentliggjorde også det Vanunu fortalte om den elendige arbeidsmoralen ved Dimona, og hvordan dette innebar en meget sterk økning av risikoen for at noe kunne gå galt.
Vanunu berettet for avisen at ledelsen ved Dimona var vel kjent med den dårlige disiplinen "på gølvet". Mange av de ansatte var ikke på plass. Anlegget ble jo langt på vei drevet gjennom automatiserte prosesser som gikk sin gang, og det var et uhyre kjedelig arbeid å sitte og vente på signaler om avvik. Så kjedelig var det at få av de ansatte orket å ta sine plikter helt på alvor, i stedet sov de eller spilte kort i kantinen. Siden folkene var så dårlige til å holde vakt, ble det til at ingeniørene sørget for høylydte alarmer og automatisk stans av prosessene ved avvik.
Men med slike tiltak oppnådde de bare å gjøre jobbene enda kjedeligere - ingeniører er ikke psykologer, og kanskje har problemet ingen løsning - folkene ble bare enda mer umotiverte til å holde seg våkne på post. Det var ingen liten styrke som skulle være i beredskap på nattskiftene. På Vanunus tid var det i alt 43 fagfolk av ulike slag, elektrikere, kjemikere, teknikere som - i beste fall - spilte kort. De fleste lå og sov. Ingeniørene var godt kjent med den dårlige arbeidsmoralen, mange av dem hadde tatt etterutdannelse etter selv å ha vært "på gølvet" i mange år. Men om vakthavende ingeniør kom på overraskelsesbesøk hjemmefra, oppdaget han aldri noe. Det var fast praksis at vakten ved innkjørselen ringte og advarte de gangene en overordnet var underveis for å inspisere.
Vanunu mener at det bare var han og en kollega som alltid holdt seg våken. Men ingen ble oppdaget, det ble heller aldri reagert mot denne sviktende arbeidsmoralen.
Det har i det hele tatt vist seg vanskelig, kanskje bortimot umulig, å få til fungerende sikring mot slike forhold, det gjelder ikke bare i Israel. I forbindelse med en ny skandale rundt håndteringen av atomavfall, den såkalte Castor-skandalen i 1998, skrev Fritz Vorholtz i Die Zeit:
Lenge var atomskandalen fra 1988, med Hanau-firmaene Transnuklear og Nukem, den største i Forbundsrepublikken. Den gangen ble det avdekket en sammensvergelse av kriminelle som drev med svindel, smøring, fiksing og bestikkelser Š To av de ansvarlige tok sine liv, og en rekke av de involverte fikk lange fengselsstraffer. Daværende miljøminister Klaus Töpfer omorganiserte de tyske atomfirmaene ... men ifølge en rapport fra Greenpeace er det ikke blitt noen endring når det gjelder de egentlige årsakene til skandalen.
Gjennom 40 år leste jeg Teknisk Ukeblad regelmessig og registrerte undertiden redaksjonelle hjertesukk om hvor lite folk flest forsto av teknologiske forhold, og hvor mye bedre landet ville ha blitt styrt om bare ingeniørene fikk litt mer innflytelse i de politiske prosessene.
Jeg tror mange slags eksperter trenger en folkelig bremse og et korrektiv fra andre miljøer, for eksempel at biologer, psykologer og zoologer kan ha viktige ting å fortelle til ingeniørene om naturens begrensninger - og menneskets! Når tekniske ting går feil, er det vanlig å si at det var en "menneskelig svikt", mens jeg vil si at den svikten lå på skrivebordene, hvor man ikke tok i betraktning at alt avhenger av mennesker - som blir syke, har kjærlighetssorg, tømmermenn, eller kanskje feilkalkulerer et eller annet, selv om de er i sin beste form. Selv ikke en maskin, eller datamaskin, er for øvrig unntatt fra loven om at alt som kan gå galt, går galt. Skrivebordsfantasier om de perfekte systemene som hindrer feil med atomteknologien, har jeg ingen tro på.
Jeg kan tenke meg to grunner til at The Sunday Times ikke nevnte den elendige sikkerheten ved Dimona-anlegget. Enten ville avisen unngå uro og bekymring - hele atomsektoren er avhengig av en god porsjon uvitenhet blant folk om risiko og konsekvenser. The Sunday Times kan også ha fryktet at temaet atomulykke ville trekke oppmerksomheten vekk fra oppslagets hovedtema, som var de sikkerhetspolitiske, regionale og internasjonale politiske implikasjonene av Israels atomvåpenprogram.
Men for Israels innbyggere er aspektet atomsikkerhet og risiko påført folket gjennom Dimona - i tillegg til all risiko atomvåpnene representerer. Og det er enda en grunn til å se annerledes på Vanunu og takke en som var folkets og demokratiets beskytter - en "Folkets spion". Det var all grunn til å få nedsatt en bred israelsk undersøkelseskommisjon for å se på sikkerheten og rutinene, i 1986 - og sikkert fortsatt i dag.
"Jaså, så du har hørt om det - fra hvem?" er Mordechais bemerkning da jeg starter å lese for ham om forholdene ved Dimona. Men min kilde er min. Mordechai er urolig for at det kan bli oppfattet som om han fortsetter å snakke om Dimona. På den annen siden - må jeg understreke for ham - det er jo nettopp tilstander av denne art som ikke kan dekkes over ved hjelp av taushetsplikt. I slike tilfeller må lojaliteten med landets borgere telle langt tyngre enn hensynet til de myndighetene, som har utsatt borgerne for så stor fare. Israel ønsker å betraktes som et demokrati. Dette bør være særdeles interessant og viktig for israelsk opinion. Foretrekker israelerne at Vanunu er lojal mot de lederne som har utsatt landet for så store farer, eller mot sine medborgere i Israel?
Kommentaren jeg sendte
- Årets fredspris, til IAEA og generaldirektør El Baradei retter med all grunn oppmerksomheten mot avskaffelse av alle atomvåpen. Det fins ikke noe viktigere for verdens overlevelse, uttaler visepresidenten i International Peace Bureau, Fredrik S. Heffermehl til NTB. - Men El Baradei arbeider i spagat, med en uløselig oppgave. Det er en stor selvmotsigelse i at IAEA skal fremme sivil atomkraft og hindre spredning av atomvåpen. Sivil atomkraft sprer atomteknologisk know-how og spaltbare materialer, de to avgjørende faktorene for å produsere atomvåpen.
Heffermehl utga for to dager siden en bok om det internasjonale arbeidet for å fjerne alle atomvåpen, "Vanunu - hans kamp og kampen for ham". Her fremlegges opplysninger om elendig arbeidsdisiplin ved Dimona-anlegget, de aller fleste sov eller spilte kort i stedet for å skjøtte sine oppgaver. Dette er informasjon som varsleren Vanunu i 1986 ga til Sunday Times, men som ikke ble publisert den gang. Heffermehl advarer i boken om at "Skrivebordsfantasier om de perfekte systemene som hindrer feil med atomteknologien, har jeg ingen tro på." -- Det store dilemma i hele atomnedrustningsarbeidet er at all oppmerksomheten går på å hindre spredning, mens El Baradeis virkelige utfordring er å få atommaktene til å respektere sin plikt etter avtalen, nemlig å avskaffe sine atomvåpen. Det var vilkåret for ät resten av verden gikk med på å avstå fra atomvåpen. I stedet ser man at den ledende atommakten, USA, utvikler nye og mer brukbare våpen, avslutter Heffermehl.

10/07/2005
Sino-U.S. Energy Competition in Africa
Drafted By: Chietigj Bajpaee
http://www.pinr.com
With oil prices hitting record levels of US$70 per barrel in recent weeks, major energy consuming countries are engaging in an increasingly heated competition for energy resources on the world stage. Nowhere is this more evident than between the United States and China, the world's first and second largest energy consuming countries respectively. In the contest for energy resources, numerous "stages" of competition are emerging, including the Middle East, Central Asia, Latin America, and the East and South China Seas. However, Africa is fast emerging as one of the most volatile stages of Sino-U.S. energy competition, given its vast reserves of energy resources and concentration of internal security crises. [See: "Setting the Stage for a New Cold War: China's Quest for Energy Security"]
Africa owns about eight percent of the world's known oil reserves with Nigeria, Libya and Equatorial Guinea as the region's leading oil producers. Seventy percent of Africa's oil production is concentrated in West Africa's Gulf of Guinea, which stretches from the Ivory Coast to Angola. The low sulphur content of West African crude makes it of further strategic importance.
However, the region is also vulnerable to instabilities ranging from piracy to terrorism, interstate and tribal conflict, AIDS and political uncertainties. Given the weak governments and significant Muslim populations of the region, the African continent may also emerge as a hub for al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups.
Finally, oil-rich countries in Africa have been unable to escape the "curse of oil," which has fueled corruption, conflict, and environmental degradation across the region. For instance, while Nigeria has earned US$300 billion in oil revenues over the last 25 years, per capita income remains below US$1 per day. Nigeria is also subject to ethnic violence, oil strikes and sporadic attacks on oil infrastructure by the Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force. Adding Sino-U.S. energy competition to this volatile mix could further destabilize the region.
U.S.-Africa Energy Relations
The U.S. currently derives 15 percent of its oil supplies from Africa as compared to 22 percent from the Persian Gulf. Within the next ten years, the U.S. could be depending on Africa for a quarter of its oil supplies according to the U.S. National Intelligence Council. Nigeria alone is the fifth biggest source of U.S. oil imports with the United States accounting for half of Nigeria's oil exports. Washington has also re-established diplomatic and energy relations with Libya following the removal of economic sanctions in September 2003 after Libya abandoned its nuclear weapons program.
In addition to securing energy supplies in the region, the U.S. has a burgeoning economic relationship with the region and has been increasingly concerned with Africa's security situation, political freedoms and human rights record. U.S.-Africa trade stood at US$44.5 billion in 2004 with oil-rich Nigeria being the second-largest source of U.S. investment after South Africa. Since the September 11 attacks, the U.S. has also stepped up security cooperation with African states. The U.S. Coast Guard has increased patrols of the region as well as engaged in training, intelligence sharing and public relations exercises with numerous states including Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde, Ghana, Benin, and Equatorial Guinea.
Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department's Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorist Initiative has trained troops in Niger, Mauritania, Mali and Chad. The U.S. also maintains a military base in Djibouti from where it coordinates anti-terrorism operations on the continent. [See: "Do Al-Qaeda's East Africa Operations Pose a Threat to U.S. Interests?"]
Nevertheless, with military assets tied up in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Persian Gulf, the U.S. has not been able to devote the necessary attention to Africa, which in turn has allowed other countries such as China to make further inroads.
Sino-Africa Energy Relations
China currently derives a quarter of its oil imports from Africa, with oil interests in Algeria, Angola, Chad and Sudan and increasing stakes in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Nigeria. China's energy interests in Chad are of particular interest given that Chad still maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
China's growing energy partnership with Sudan represents one of a number of areas where Sino-U.S. energy interests diverge in Africa. China National Petroleum Corporation established oil exploration rights in Sudan in 1995. Two years later when Washington cut ties with Sudan, China filled the vacuum making Sudan China's largest overseas production base. More than half of Sudan's oil exports go to China, accounting for five percent of China's total oil imports. C.N.P.C. owns a 40 percent stake in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company and pumps over 300,000 barrels per day in Sudan. Another Chinese firm, Sinopec, is constructing a 1500 kilometer (932 miles) pipeline to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, where China's Petroleum Engineering Construction Group is building a tanker terminal.
As in the case of U.S. relations with Africa, China's relations with Africa are multidimensional. However, in recent years China's political, economic and military relations with Africa have been subordinated to its quest to secure energy resources in the African continent as energy resources are being secured in exchange for aid, arms or infrastructure investment. China's goodwill with African states can be traced back to its support for anti-colonial struggles in the 1960s. However, China's relations with Africa have shifted from holding a strong ideological bias in support of communist regimes and Marxist insurgencies to being led by market and resource considerations.
Today the only ideological component to Sino-African relations is the One China principle, although there are even exceptions to this as seen in the case of growing Chinese energy interests in Chad, which still has diplomatic relations with Taiwan. At present, only seven African states hold diplomatic relations with Taiwan. African states are also drawn to China by its non-ideological, non-interventionist approach, which contrasts with the Western approach that places an emphasis on democracy, governance, human rights and humanitarian intervention.
China has also appealed to Africa through numerous goodwill gestures. For example, the Chinese foreign minister has maintained a policy of making his first official overseas trip to the African continent every year. For decades, China has also supported numerous infrastructure projects across Africa, as well as sending doctors and nurses to the region, establishing scholarships for African students to study in Chinese universities, providing training to African businessmen and trade officials, and supplying funds to encourage Chinese businesses to invest in Africa.
China also maintains dialogue with Africa through several bilateral and multilateral forums such as the Asia-Africa Summit and the China-Africa Business Council, which was jointly established with the United Nations Development Programme in November 2004 to support China's private sector investment in Cameroon, Ghana, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania. In 2000, China also initiated the China-Africa Cooperation Forum comprising 46 of the 53 African countries. Among its accomplishments is canceling US$1.2 billion in debt for 31 African countries. China is also engaged in negotiations to create a free trade area with the Southern African Customs Union, as well as coordinating with African states in international organizations such as the World Trade Organization and United Nations.
On the economic front, Sino-Africa trade increased by 50 percent between 2002 and 2003 to US$18.5 billion, which is expected to grow to US$30 billion by 2005. At present, 700 Chinese companies operate in 49 African countries and eight African countries have been granted the status of "officially approved travel destinations" by China. China has also expanded its military presence in the region as seen with its deployment of peacekeepers to Liberia in December 2003, which occurred two months after Liberia switched its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to China. China has also sent a peacekeeping contingent to the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as providing uniforms to Mozambique's army, helicopters to Mali and Angola, and weapons to Namibia and Sierra Leone.
Many of China's diplomatic initiatives in Africa are in direct conflict with U.S. policy toward the region. For example, Beijing supplied US$1 billion in arms to both Ethiopia and Eritrea during their war from 1998 to 2000. Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe, whose regime has been isolated from the West due to its forced eviction of slum dwellers and white farmers, has also turned to China for aid. Chinese investment in Zimbabwe amounted to US$600 million in 2004. China has upgraded Zimbabwe's transport infrastructure, provided roofing material for Mugabe's US$9 million palace, and provided the regime with Chinese-made Karakoroum military trainer jets, MA60 passenger planes, and radio-jamming equipment for a military base outside Harare, which has been used to block transmissions by opposition parties.
China is also one of Sudan's leading arms suppliers. Sudan is the largest recipient of Chinese overseas investment and up to 10,000 Chinese nationals work in the country. The Sudanese government, which has recently concluded a peace agreement with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (S.P.L.M./A.) in the south, is still engaged in a conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan using proxy militias such as the Janjaweed. In 2004, the U.N. Security Council was forced to water down a resolution condemning atrocities in the Darfur region to avoid a Chinese veto. China abstained in the vote over the final weaker resolution. With Sudan and Iran together supplying China with 20 percent of its oil imports, U.S. attempts to contain these regimes bring it into direct conforntation with China's energy security policies. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Sudan"]
The United States and China are not the only states vying for energy resources in Africa. Recently, Korea National Oil Corporation obtained 65 percent oil and gas production rights in two Nigerian offshore blocks, while India's Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Videsh obtained a 25 percent stake. South Korea and India are the world's fourth and sixth largest energy consumers respectively. India and China both hold stakes in the Greater Nile Oil Project in Sudan with India having invested US$700 million in Sudan's oil sector. China and India have also been engaged in direct competition for African energy resources, as seen in October 2004 when China outbid India to buy an interest in an offshore block in Angola. [See: "Economic Brief: China's Energy Acquisitions"]
Conclusion
Sino-U.S. relations are going through a cold spell as a result of disputes over U.S. quotas on Chinese-made textiles and China's military expenditures, exchange rate policy, intellectual property rights infringements, human rights record, and relations with dictatorial "rogue" or anti-U.S. regimes including Iran, Myanmar, Nepal, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. The recent postponement of the much-anticipated meeting between Chinese President Hu Jintao and U.S. President George W. Bush in Washington as a result of the relief efforts for Hurricane Katrina is likely to add insult to injury among some in Beijing. [See: "Economic Brief: Textile Quotas"]
While there have been gestures of rapprochement in Sino-U.S. relations such as the recently initiated Sino-U.S. Strategic Dialogue and both states along with India, Australia, Japan and South Korea establishing an energy partnership known as the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development, the competition to secure energy resources on the world stage could fuel their already shaky relationship.
The recent failed bid by Chinese energy company China National Offshore Oil Corporation to acquire U.S. energy company Unocal is evidence of this. Facing a plethora of internal crises ranging from poverty to poor governance and civil war, Africa is likely to emerge as a volatile stage of Sino-U.S. energy competition. African states have been drawn to China by its non-interventionist, non-ideological approach in conducting relations, although China's attempts to secure energy resources in conflict-ridden states by offering aid or arms-for-oil could heighten instability in the region.
Report Drafted By:
Chietigj Bajpaee
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written permission of inquiries@pinr.com. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.

10/07/2005
Bush Will Veto Anti-Torture Law after Senate Revolt
by Francis Harris
© 2005 Iraq Veterans Against the War and The Telegraph (UK)
http://www.ivaw.net/index.php?id=161
The Bush administration pledged yesterday to veto legislation banning the torture of prisoners by US troops after an overwhelming and almost unprecedented revolt by loyalist congressmen.
The mutiny was the latest setback for an administration facing an increasingly independent and bloody-minded legislature. But it also marked a key moment in Congress's campaign to curtail the huge powers it has granted the White House since 2001 in its war against terrorism.
The late-night Senate vote saw the measure forbidding torture passed by 90 to nine, with most Republicans backing the measure. Most senators said the Abu Ghraib abuse scandal and similar allegations at the Guantánamo Bay prison rendered the result a foregone conclusion.
The administration's extraordinary isolation was underlined when the Senate Republican majority leader, Bill Frist, supported the amendment.
The man behind the legislation, Republican Senator John McCain, who was tortured as a prisoner in Vietnam, said the move was backed by American soldiers. His amendment would prohibit the "cruel, inhumane or degrading" treatment of prisoners in the custody of America's defense department.
The vote was one of the largest and best supported congressional revolts during President George W Bush's five years in office, and shocked the White House.
"We have put out a Statement of Administration Policy saying that his advisers would recommend that he vetoes it if it contains such language," White House spokesman Scott McClellan warned yesterday.
The administration said Congress was attempting to tie its hands in the war against terrorism.
The veto would be Bush's first use of his most extreme legislative option. But senators pointed out that a presidential veto can be overturned by a two-thirds majority in both houses.
For now the amendment's fate depends on negotiations between the Senate and the lower chamber, the House of Representatives, which is more loyal to the administration.
But senators said they were confident that most of the language would survive and that the issue could pose an extremely awkward dilemma for the president.
The amendment was attached to the $440 billion (£247 billion) defense-spending bill, and if Bush vetoes the amendment, he would have to veto the entire bill.
That would leave America's armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan short of cash as early as the middle of next month.

10/07/2005
Plutoniumforurening nær Thule
http://www.dr.dk/Nyheder/Indland/2005/10/07/104347.htm
Der er fundet plutonium på landjorden i området nær Thule hvor et amerikansk bombefly i 1968 styrtede med et last på fire brint-bomber.
En ny rapport fra forskningscentret Risø dokumenterer, at der er plutoniumsforurening på landjorden ved Narssarssuk - Dundas - i Nordgrønland...

10/07/2005
CONTRACTS from the United States Department of Defense
Rockwell Collins Government Systems, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, is being awarded a $49,999,999 firm fixed price indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contract to provide Rockwell Collins Security Devices for Global Positioning System receivers. These devices include Precise Positioning Services Modules and Auxiliary Output Chips Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module. The location of performance is Rockwell Collins, Coralville, Iowa. The work will be complete by September 2010. Negotiations were complete September 2005. The Headquarters Space and Missile Systems Center, Los Angeles Air Force Base, Calif. is the contracting activity (FA8807-05-D-0004).
Lockheed Martin Mission Systems, Colorado Springs, Colo., is being awarded a $44,018,059 cost plus award fee/cost plus fixed fee/firm fixed price/time and materials contract modification. This action exercises the fiscal 2005 option CLINs for the Integrated Space Command and Control System USSTRATCOM Command Center Upgrade, Mobile Consolidated Command and Control, and the Shared Early Warning System. In addition, this action is a modification to the basic contract to definitize in-scope engineering change proposals for the Single Integrated Space Picture, Space Situational Awareness Command and Control Test Bed, System Operations training for network operations, equipment installation in the USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center and adds additional incremental funding to cover fiscal year 05 development and sustainment overruns. ISC2 will modernize the command and control system of North American Aerospace Defense Command and USSTRATCOM into an integrated, interoperable, state of the art capability to support the National Command Authority and the Canadian Chief of Defense Staff for the defense of North America. The C2 system provides warning of ballistic missile, aircraft, space, and information attacks against North America. Using modern software, ISC2 will integrate worldwide communications networks, computer systems, and software to provide an integrated view of worldwide events that will ensure complete and timely situational awareness that can support political and military command decisions worldwide. At this time, $7,747,247 has been obligated. This work will be complete in December 2008. The Headquarters Electronic Systems Command, Hanscom Air Force Base, Mass., is the contracting activity (F19628-00-C-0019/P00059).
L3/Interstate Electronics Corp., Anaheim, Calif., is being awarded a $27,862,500 cost-plus-fixed-fee, cost-plus-incentive-fee contract. The contractor shall provide services including program management, system engineering support, liaison engineering, training, documentation, manufacturing support, logistics, contract inventory services, and field services to ensure the data capture rate, availability and accuracy of the TRIDENT II FBM Test Instrumentation hardware systems including M345/LASS, M240/M240R, and M250 systems. In addition the contractor shall provide for the United Kingdom Level-Of-Effort support, repairs and replenishment and SPALTs (Strategic Systems Programs alternations). Work will be performed in Anaheim, Calif., and is expected to be completed by September 2005. This contract was not competitively procured. Contract funds in the amount of $22,474,700 will expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Navy's Strategic Systems Program, Washington, D.C., is the contracting activity (N00030-05-C-0001).
Lockheed Martin Corp., Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co., Ft. Worth, Texas, is being awarded a $6,528,956,871 modification to re-baseline the previously awarded cost-plus-award-fee F-35 Joint Strike Fighter System Development and Demonstration contract (N00019-02-C-3002). The modification establishes the funding, technical requirements and schedule required to complete the re-baseline program and perform additional work associated with the integration of a P5 Combat Training System, Alternate Mission Equipment (AME) Survivability improvements, Shared Courseware Object Reference Model (SCORM) requirements, certification of the Precision Guided Bomb, and radar modifications. Work will be performed in Ft. Worth, Texas (75 percent); El Segundo, Calif. (15 percent); and Wharton, United Kingdom (10 percent), and is expected to be completed in October 2013. Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year. The Naval Air Systems Command, Patuxent River, Md., is the contracting activity.
MILCOM Systems Corp., Virginia Beach, Va., is being awarded a $9,900,000 modification to a previously awarded indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity, cost plus, fixed fee, performance based contract (N65236-03-D-7842) for ship alteration, installation, and drafting services supporting C4ISR cryptologic, communications and intelligence systems. The cumulative value of this contract, including this modification is $49,014,978. Work will be performed in Charleston, S.C. (51 percent); Tidewater, Va. (23 percent); Jacksonville, Fla. (14 percent); and San Diego, Ca. (12 percent), and is expected to be completed by June 2005*.* Contract funds will not expire at the end of the current fiscal year._ _ This contract was competitively procured with unlimited proposals solicited and four offers received via the Federal Business Opportunities website, and the SPAWAR e-Commerce Central website. The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center, Charleston, S.C. is the contracting activity.

10/07/2005

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