Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 25. Juli 1990 / Time Line July 25, 1990
Version 3.007/25/1990
Meeting on July 25, 1990 between US Ambassador to Iraq April
Glaspie and President Saddam Hussein that the Iraqi leader
interpreted as a green light from Washington for his invasion of
Kuwait eight days later.
Source: Transcript of Meeting Between Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein and U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie. - July 25, 1990 , printed in the New York Times, September 23, 1990.
July 25, 1990 - Presidential Palace - Baghdad
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - I have direct instructions from President Bush to improve our relations with Iraq. We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait. (pause) As you know, I lived here for years and admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. (pause) We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your threat s against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship - not confrontation - regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait's borders?
Saddam Hussein - As you know, for years now I have made every effort to reach a settlement on our dispute with Kuwait. There is to be a meeting in two days; I am prepared to give negotiations only this one more brief chance. (pause) When we (the Iraqis) meet (with the Kuwaitis) and we see there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death.
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - What solutions would be acceptab le?
Saddam Hussein - If we could keep the whole of the Shatt al Arab - our strategic goal in our war with Iran - we will make concessions (to the Kuwaitis). But, if we are forced to choose between keeping half of the Shatt and the whole of Iraq (i.e., in Saddam s view, including Kuwait ) then we will give up all of the Shatt to defend our claims on Kuwait to keep the whole of Iraq in the shape we wish it to be. (pause) What is the United States' opinion on this?
U.S. Ambassador Glaspie - We have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary (of State James) Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960's, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America. (Saddam smiles)
07/25/1990
Operation
Aqueduct
Tre underjordiske
amerikanske
atomvåbenforsøg i Nevada.
/ Underground U.S. nuclear weapons tests in Nevada.
/ Souterrains américains essais d'armes nucléaires dans le Nevada
/ Subterráneo de Estados Unidos las pruebas de armas nucleares en Nevada.
/ Unterirdisch US Atomwaffentests in Nevada.
Kilde:
United States Nuclear Tests, July 1945 through September
1992. 
U.S. Department of Energy Nevada Operations Office, DOE/NV--209-REV
15, December 2000.
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