Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 4. Oktober
2010 / Time Line October 4, 2010
Version 3.5
3. Oktober 2010, 5. Oktober 2010
10/04/2010
National Security Archive Update, October 4, 2010
THE IRAQ WAR -- PART III: Shaping the Debate
U.S. and British Documents Show Transatlantic Propaganda
Cooperation
Joint Drafting & Editing of White Papers "Fixed the Facts"
Edited by John Prados and Christopher Ames
Washington, DC, October 4, 2010 - For nearly a year before the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the British government of Prime Minister Tony
Blair collaborated closely with the George W. Bush administration
to produce a far starker picture of the threat from Saddam Hussein
and his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) than was justified by
intelligence at the time, according to British and American
government documents posted today by the National Security
Archive.
With the aim of strengthening the political case for going to war,
both governments regularly coordinated their assessments, the
records show, occasionally downplaying and even eliminating points
of disagreement over the available intelligence. The new materials,
acquired largely through the U.K. Freedom of Information Act and
often featuring less redacted versions of previously released
records, also reveal that the Blair administration, far earlier
than has been appreciated until now, utilized public relations
specialists to help craft the formal intelligence "white papers"
about Iraq's WMD program.
At one point, even though intelligence officials were skeptical,
the British went so far as to incorporate in their white paper
allegations about Saddam's nuclear ambitions because they had been
made publicly by President Bush and Vice President Cheney.
The documents also show that:
* From early 2002 both governments were seeking regime change, but
Prime Minister Blair and his officials were very conscious of the
need to make a case for war, based on claims about Iraqi WMDs.
* From March 2002--the very beginning of the process--the U.S. and
U.K. administrations were concerned to achieve consistency in their
claims about Iraqi weapons, often at the cost of accuracy. In the
spring of 2002 the two countries began to produce in parallel the
white papers on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that they
published that fall. At least two drafts of the respective white
papers were exchanged from either side in order to avoid providing
grist for "opponents of action."
* Officials working on the parallel papers took part in a number of
secure video conferences to avoid inconsistencies between the
documents. Both sides accelerated the drafting of their white
papers in September 2002 as part of a coordinated propaganda
effort.
* Officials re-drafting the U.K.'s white paper or "dossier" in
September 2002 were told to ensure that it "complemented" rather
than contradicted claims in the U.S. document. A draft of the U.K.
dossier was brought to Washington by intelligence chief John
Scarlett for U.S. input.
* In addition, U.K. officials examined the draft U.S. white paper
closely and sought to match its claims. The U.S. paper has been
described by one of its authors as intended "to strengthen the case
of going to war with the American public."
* The U.K. white paper was amended to incorporate a number of
claims about Saddam's alleged nuclear ambitions that intelligence
officials found questionable but were included because President
Bush and Vice President Cheney made public reference to them, for
example the allegation that Iraq could obtain a nuclear weapon
within a brief one- or two-year timeframe.
* The U.S. paper, which had omitted the same claims from an early
draft, also included them after the President and Vice President's
public references to them.
* In addition, the U.K. dossier was heavily influenced by Blair
advisers and public relations experts, including Alastair Campbell,
Blair's director of communications. Its drafters were also willing
to change it to fit in with public statements from British
government advisers, whether or not those statements were true.
10/04/2010
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