Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 15. Mars 2007 / Time Line March 15, 2007
Version 3.503/15/2007
CND condemns decision to proceed with Trident replacement;
welcomes large rebellion
http://www.cnduk.org/
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament today strongly condemned
parliament’s decision to support the government’s plans
to replace Trident, Britain’s nuclear weapons system.
The government’s motion to replace Trident passed despite a
significant rebellion by backbench Labour MPs. The government was
forced to rely heavily on the Conservatives in order to pass the
controversial motion. This was the biggest rebellion during
Blair’s tenure other than the Iraq war.
An amendment tabled by Jon Trickett, Sir Menzies Campbell, Dr Gavin
Strang, Nick Harvey, Peter Kilfoyle and Joan Ruddock, which stated
that the case for Trident replacement is not yet proven and
expressed doubt about the need for an early decision, was also
defeated by the Blair – Cameron alliance.
Small Fuze - Big Effect
Hans Møller Kristensen
http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/03/small_fuze_big_effect_1.php#more
"It is not true,” British Defence Secretary Des Browne
insisted during an interview with BBC radio, that a new fuze
planned for British nuclear warheads and reported by the
Guardian
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/homeaffairs/story/0,,2033401,00.html
will increase their military capability. The plan to replace the
fuze “was reported to the [Parliament’s] Select
Committee in 2005 and is not an upgrading of the system; it is
merely making sure that the system works to its maximum
efficiency," Mr. Browne says.
The minister is either being ignorant or economical with the truth.
According to numerous statements made by US officials over the past
decade, the very purpose of replacing the fuze is – in stark
contrast to Mr. Browne’s assurance - to give the weapon
improved military capabilities it did not have before.
03/15/2007
United States Government Accountability Office, GAO Report to
Congressional Committees
Joint Strike Fighter : Progress Made and
Challenges Remain
March, 15, 2007
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07360.pdf
GAO is recommending that DOD limit annual production quantities to
no more than 24 aircraft per year until each variant’s basic
flying qualities have been demonstrated in flight testing now
scheduled in the 2010 time frame. DOD non-concurred, believing its
current strategy provides a balance of technical risk, financial
constraints, and operational needs.
The JSF program has delivered and flown the first development
aircraft. However, cost and schedule goals established in the
fiscal year 2004 rebaselined program have not been met. Total JSF
program acquisition costs (through 2027) have increased by $31.6
billion and now DOD will pay 12 percent more per aircraft than
expected in 2004. The program has also experienced delays in
several key events, including the start of the flight test program,
delivery of the first production representative development
aircraft, and testing of critical missions systems. Delays in the
delivery of initial development aircraft were driven by incomplete
engineering drawings, changes in design, manufacturing
inefficiencies, and parts shortages. Despite these delays, the
program still plans to complete development in 2013, compressing
the amount of time available for flight testing and development
activities. Also, the program projects it will meet all but one key
performance requirement—line of sight communications---that
is currently dependent on other capabilities being developed
outside the JSF program.
Accurately predicting JSF costs and schedule and ensuring
sufficient funding will likely be key challenges facing the program
in the future. JSF continues to pursue a risky acquisition strategy
that concurrently develops and produces aircraft. While some
concurrency may be beneficial to efficiently transition from
development to production, the degree of overlap is significant on
this program. Any changes in design and manufacturing that require
modifications to delivered aircraft or to tooling and manufacturing
processes would result in increased costs and delays in getting
capabilities to the warfighter. Low-rate initial production will
begin this year with almost the entire 7-year flight test program
remaining to confirm the aircraft design.
Confidence that investment decisions will deliver expected
capability within cost and schedule goals increases as testing
proves the JSF will work as expected. The JSF program also faces
funding uncertainties as it will demand unprecedented funding over
the next 2 decades—more than $12.6 billion a year on average
through 2027.
03/15/2007
DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Missile Defense
Acquisition Strategy Generates Results but Delivers Less at a
Higher Cost
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07387.pdf
What GAO Recommends
GAO continues to encourage DOD to act on prior recommendations to
implement a knowledge-based acquisition strategy for all BMDS
elements and to adopt more transparent criteria for reporting each
element’s quantities, cost, and performance. In this report,
GAO recommends that DOD adopt firm baselines, use procurement funds
for operational assets, and adopt other measures to better track
cost and outcomes against goals. DOD did not agree to an
element-based reporting approach but is investigating other ways to
provide more program transparency.
During fiscal year 2006, MDA fielded additional assets for the
Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), enhanced the capability of
some assets, and realized several noteworthy testing achievements.
For example, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element
successfully conducted its first end-to-end test of one engagement
scenario, the element’s first successful intercept test since
2002. However, MDA will not meet its original Block 2006 cost,
fielding, or performance goals because the agency has revised those
goals. In March 2006, MDA:
• reduced its goal for fielded assets to provide funds for
technical problems and new and increased operations and sustainment
requirements;
• increased its cost goal by about $1 billion—from $19.3
to $20.3 billion; and
• reduced its performance goal commensurate with the reduction
of assets.
MDA may also reduce the scope of the block further by deferring
other work until a future block because four elements incurred
about $478 million in fiscal year 2006 budget overruns.
With the possible exception of GMD interceptors, MDA is generally
on track to meet its revised quantity goals. But the deferral of
work, both into and out of Block 2006, and inconsistent reporting
of costs by some BMDS elements, makes the actual cost of Block 2006
difficult to determine. In addition, GAO cannot assess whether the
block will meet its revised performance goals until MDA’s
models and simulations are anchored by sufficient flight tests to
have confidence that predictions of performance are reliable.
Because MDA has not entered the Department of Defense (DOD)
acquisition cycle, it is not yet required to apply certain laws
intended to hold major defense acquisition programs accountable for
their planned outcomes and cost, give decision makers a means to
conduct oversight, and ensure some level of independent program
review. MDA is more agile in its decision-making because it does
not have to wait for outside reviews or obtain higher-level
approvals of its goals or changes to those goals. Because MDA can
revise its baseline, it has the ability to field fewer assets than
planned, defer work to a future block, and increase planned cost.
All of this makes it hard to reconcile cost and outcomes against
original goals and to determine the value of the work accomplished.
Also, using research and development funds to purchase operational
assets allows costs to be spread over 2 or more years, which makes
costs harder to track and commits future budgets.
MDA continues to identify quality assurance weaknesses, but the
agency’s corrective measures are beginning to produce
results. Quality deficiencies are declining as MDA implements
corrective actions, such as a teaming approach, designed to restore
the reliability of key suppliers.
03/15/2007
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
Targeting women: the forgotten victims of the conflict
Amnesty International, International Secretariat
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engafr310012007
1. INTRODUCTION
Hundreds, possibly thousands, of women and girls have been victims
of widespread and, at times, systematic rape and sexual assault
committed by combatant forces or by civilians with close ties to
these forces.(1) The scale of rape and sexual violence in
Côte d’Ivoire in the course of the armed conflict has
been largely underestimated. Many women have been gang raped or
have been abducted and reduced to sexual slavery by fighters.(2)
Rape has often been accompanied by the beating or torture
(including torture of a sexual nature) of the victim. Rape has been
committed in public and in front of family members, including
children. Some women have been raped next to the corpses of family
members.
In the context of the political and military crisis which has
divided Côte d’Ivoire since September 2002, leaving the
south controlled by the government and the north by an armed
opposition group, the New Forces (Forces Nouvelles), national and
international human rights provisions are no longer observed. All
armed factions have perpetrated and continue to perpetrate sexual
violence with impunity. Hundreds of thousands of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) have sought refuge in the
government-controlled south and hundreds of thousands of refugees
have fled to neighboring countries, including Liberia, Guinea, Mali
and Burkina Faso. The resulting humanitarian crisis has placed
women in particular in positions of extreme vulnerability, leading
to increased poverty and higher rates of sex work as women
separated from their families struggle to survive.
Women’s rights have also been violated in the aftermath of
rape, adding to their trauma and suffering. Most women suffering
injuries or illnesses caused by rape – some of them
life-threatening – have been unable to access the medical
care they need. Stigmatized by rape, some women have been abandoned
by their partners or families, and condemned, often along with
dependent children, to extreme poverty. A collapsed judicial system
in the north and the absence of political will in the
government-controlled south means there is no possibility of
justice or effective redress for the crimes they have endured.
Owing to continuing insecurity, women often live in fear of further
attacks or reprisals if they speak out against the
perpetrators.
This report is the result of research conducted primarily in 2005
and 2006, including interviews in Côte d’Ivoire with
rape victims and their relatives, local human rights activists,
local and international humanitarian organizations. The interviews
were carried out in and around Abidjan and in the area around
Guiglo, in the west of the country. The rapes and sexual assaults
highlighted in this report occurred between 2000 and 2006. In all
cases, names have been changed to protect the identities of the
women whose testimonies appear in this report. Complete versions of
some of these and other testimonies are being published
simultaneously in an accompanying document.(3)
This report contains recommendations addressed to the Ivorian
government as well as the New Forces, asking them to prevent and
eradicate sexual violence committed by their forces and supporters
and put an end to impunity by bringing those responsible to
justice. The report also calls on all the parties, as well as the
international community, to address the urgent needs of rape
victims, in particular, access to adequate medical care.
Unless an organized and comprehensive programme is developed to
respond to their various needs, victims of sexual violence will
continue to suffer and die needlessly and many more women will
remain at risk of such violence. All parties and international
actors must acknowledge the gravity of the situation and take
effective action to respect and protect the human rights of these
forgotten victims.
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