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Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 18 januar 2007 / Time Line January 18, 2007

Version 3.5

17. Januar 2007, 19. Januar 2007


01/18/2007
GAO Report to Congressional Leadership and Committees
SECURING, STABILIZING, AND REBUILDING IRAQ
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
January 18, 2007
In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the President’s strategy1 for achieving U.S. political, security, and economic goals in Iraq. The U.S. goals included establishing a peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. Based on a GAO report issued in July 20062 and other GAO reviews, this enclosure discusses (1) the extent to which the NSVI and its supporting documents addressed the six characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) how security, political, and economic factors have affected the U.S. strategy for Iraq. Congressional review of the President’s 2007 plan for Iraq should consider whether it addresses the key elements of a sound national strategy. We reported in July 2006 that the NSVI was an improvement over previous U.S. planning efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The strategy’s positive attributes included a clear purpose and scope and identification of U.S. involvement in Iraq as a “vital national interest and the central front in the war on terror.” The strategy also provided a comprehensive description of U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives was limited. Moreover, the strategy fell short in at least three other areas. First, it only partially identified the agencies responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second, it did not fully address how the U.S. will integrate its goals with those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it did not detail Iraq’s anticipated contribution to its future needs. Third, it only partially identified the current and future costs of U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding critical infrastructure.

01/18/2007

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