Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 18 januar
2007 / Time Line January 18, 2007
Version 3.5
17. Januar 2007, 19. Januar 2007
01/18/2007
GAO Report to Congressional Leadership and Committees
SECURING, STABILIZING, AND
REBUILDING IRAQ
Key Issues for Congressional Oversight
January 18, 2007
In November 2005, the National Security Council (NSC) issued the
National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI) to clarify the
President’s strategy1 for achieving U.S. political, security,
and economic goals in Iraq. The U.S. goals included establishing a
peaceful, stable, and secure Iraq. Based on a GAO report issued in
July 20062 and other GAO reviews, this enclosure discusses (1) the
extent to which the NSVI and its supporting documents addressed the
six characteristics of an effective national strategy, and (2) how
security, political, and economic factors have affected the U.S.
strategy for Iraq. Congressional review of the President’s
2007 plan for Iraq should consider whether it addresses the key
elements of a sound national strategy. We reported in July 2006
that the NSVI was an improvement over previous U.S. planning
efforts for stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. The strategy’s
positive attributes included a clear purpose and scope and
identification of U.S. involvement in Iraq as a “vital
national interest and the central front in the war on
terror.” The strategy also provided a comprehensive
description of U.S. political, security, and economic objectives in
Iraq. However, the discussion of outcome-related performance
measures to assess progress in achieving these goals and objectives
was limited. Moreover, the strategy fell short in at least three
other areas. First, it only partially identified the agencies
responsible for implementing key aspects of the strategy. Second,
it did not fully address how the U.S. will integrate its goals with
those of the Iraqis and the international community, and it did not
detail Iraq’s anticipated contribution to its future needs.
Third, it only partially identified the current and future costs of
U.S. involvement in Iraq, including maintaining U.S. military
operations, building Iraqi government capacity, and rebuilding
critical infrastructure.
01/18/2007
Top
Send
kommentar, email
eller søg i Fredsakademiet.dk
|