Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 13. Oktober 2006 / Time Line October 13, 2006
Version 3.512. Oktober 2006, 14. Oktober 2006
10/13/2006
Modtageren af
årets,
Nobelfredspris offentliggøres:
Nobels Fredspris 2006
Den Norske Nobelkomite har bestemt at Nobels fredspris for 2006
skal delast, i to like store delar, mellom Muhammad Yunus og Grameen Bank for arbeidet
deira for å skapa økonomisk og sosial utvikling
nedanfrå. Varig fred kan ikkje skapast utan at store
folkegrupper finn vegar til å bryta ut av fattigdom.
Mikrokreditt er ein slik veg. Utvikling nedanfrå verkar og
til å fremja demokrati og menneskerettar.
Muhammad Yunus har vist seg som ein leiar som har greidd å
omsetja visjonar i praktisk handling til beste for millionar av
menneske, ikkje berre i Bangladesh, men og i mange andre land i
verda. Lån til fattige utan noka økonomisk trygging
syntest vera ein umogleg tanke. Frå ein smålåten
start for tre tiår sidan har Yunus, fyrst og fremst gjennom
Grameen Bank, utvikla mikrokreditt til eit jamt viktigare
verkemiddel i kampen mot fattigdom. Grameen Bank har gjeve idear og
mønster for dei mange institusjonane innanfor mikrokreditt
som har oppstått rundt om i verda.
Kvart einaste individ på jorda har både potensiale og
rett til eit verdig liv. På tvers av kulturar og
sivilisasjonar har Yunus og Grameen Bank vist at jamvel dei
fattigaste av dei fattige kan verka til eiga utvikling.
Mikrokreditt har synt seg å vera ei viktig frigjerande kraft
i samfunn der særleg kvinner må kjempa mot
undertrykkjande sosiale og økonomiske vilkår. Det kan
ikkje skapast fullverdig økonomisk vekst og politisk
demokrati utan at den kvinnelege halvdel av menneska på jorda
medverkar på like fot med den mannlege.
Yunus sin langsiktige visjon er å avskaffa fattigdomen i
verda. Mikrokreditt kan ikkje åleine nå dit. Men
Muhammad Yunus og Grameen Bank har vist at mikrokreditt må
stå sentralt i det vidare strev for å nå dette
målet.
10/13/2006
National Security Archive Update, October 13, 2006
The Reykjavik File: Previously Secret Documents from U.S.
and Soviet Archives on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev Summit From the
collections of The National Security Archive, George Washington
University, Washington DC. National Security Archive Electronic
Briefing Book No. 203. Posted - October 13, 2006. / : Edited by Dr.
Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton.
- http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/index.htm
Washington, D.C. and Reykjavik, Iceland - President Ronald Reagan
and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev almost achieved a deal 20 years
ago at the 1986 Reykjavik summit to abolish nuclear weapons, but
the agreement would have required "an exceptional level of trust"
that neither side had yet developed, according to previously secret
U.S. and Soviet documents posted today on the Web by the National
Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org) of George Washington
University and presented on October 12 in Reykjavik directly to
Gorbachev and the president of Iceland.
The documents include Gorbachev's initial letter to Reagan from 15
September 1986 asking for "a quick one-on-one meeting, let us say
in Iceland or in London," newly translated Gorbachev discussions
with his aides and with the Politburo preparing for the meeting,
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz's briefing book for the
summit, the complete U.S. and Soviet transcripts of the Reykjavik
summit, and the internal recriminations and reflections by both
sides after the meeting failed to reach agreement.
Archive director Thomas Blanton, Archive director of Russia
programs Dr. Svetlana Savranskaya, and Pulitzer-Prize-winning
biographer Dr. William Taubman presented the documents to Gorbachev
at a state dinner in the residence of President Olafur Ragnar
Grimsson of Iceland on October 12 marking the 20th anniversary of
the summit, which Grimsson commented had put Iceland on the map as
a meeting place for international dialogue.
The documents show that U.S. analysis of Gorbachev's goals for the
summit completely missed the Soviet leader's emphasis on
"liquidation" of nuclear weapons, a dream Gorbachev shared with
Reagan and which the two leaders turned to repeatedly during the
intense discussions at Reykjavik in October 1986. But the epitaph
for the summit came from Soviet aide Gyorgy Arbatov, who at one
point during staff discussions told U.S. official Paul Nitze that
the U.S. proposals (continued testing of missile defenses in the
Strategic Defense Initiative or SDI while proceeding over 10 years
to eliminate all ballistic missiles, leading to the ultimate
abolition of all offensive nuclear weapons) would require "an
exceptional level of trust" and therefore "we cannot accept your
position."
Politburo notes from October 30, two weeks after the summit, show
that Gorbachev by then had largely accepted Reagan's formulation
for further SDI research, but by that point it was too late for a
deal. The Iran-Contra scandal was about to break, causing Reagan's
approval ratings to plummet and removing key Reagan aides like
National Security Adviser John Poindexter, whose replacement was
not interested in the ambitious nuclear abolition dreams the two
leaders shared at Reykjavik. The documents show that even the more
limited notion of abolishing ballistic missiles foundered on
opposition from the U.S. military which presented huge estimates of
needed additional conventional spending to make up for not having
the missiles.
The U.S. documents were obtained by the Archive through Freedom of
Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review requests to
the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and the U.S. Department of
State. The Soviet documents came to the Archive courtesy of top
Gorbachev aide Anatoly Sergeyevich Chernyaev, who has donated his
diary and notes of Politburo and other Gorbachev discussions to the
Archive, and from the Volkogonov collection of the U.S. Library of
Congress.
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