Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 18 Juli 2006 / Time Line July 18, 2006
Version 3.507/18/2006
Den spanske borgerkrig starter, 1936.
07/18/2006
United States Government
Accountability Office: GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
Observations on Funding, Costs, and Future Commitments
Statement of David M. Walker Comptroller General of the United
States
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President
announced a Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), requiring the
collective instruments of the entire federal government to counter
the threat of terrorism. Ongoing military and diplomatic operations
overseas, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan, constitute a key part
of GWOT. These operations involve a wide variety of activities such
as combating insurgents, civil affairs, capacity building,
infrastructure reconstruction, and training military forces of
other nations. The U.S. has reported substantial costs to date for
GWOT related activities and can expect to incur significant costs
for an unspecified time in the future, requiring decision makers to
consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces increasing
long-range fiscal challenges.
GAO has issued several reports on current and future financial
commitments required to support GWOT military operations, as well
as diplomatic efforts to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. This testimony
discusses (1) the funding Congress has appropriated to the
Department of Defense (DOD) and other U.S. government agencies for
GWOT-related military operations and reconstruction activities
since 2001; (2) costs reported for these operations and activities
and the reliability of DOD’s reported costs, and (3) issues
with estimating future U.S. financial commitments associated with
continued involvement in GWOT.
Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $430 billion to DOD and
other government agencies for military and diplomatic efforts in
support of GWOT. This funding has been provided through regular
appropriations as well as supplemental appropriations, which are
provided outside of the normal budget process. Since September
2001, DOD has received about $386 billion for GWOT military
operations. In addition, agencies including the Department of
State, DOD, and the Agency for International Development have
received since 2001 about $44 billion to fund reconstruction and
stabilization programs in Iraq ($34.5 billion) and Afghanistan ($9
billion) and an additional $400 million to be used in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Since 2001, U.S. government agencies have reported significant
costs associated with GWOT, but GAO has concerns with the
reliability of DOD’s reported cost data. Through April 2006,
DOD has reported about $273 billion in incremental costs for
GWOT-related operations overseas—costs that would not
otherwise have been incurred. DOD’s reported GWOT costs and
appropriated amounts differ generally because DOD’s cost
reporting does not capture some items such as intelligence and Army
modular force transformation. Also, DOD has not yet used funding
made available for multiple years, such as procurement and military
construction. GAO’s prior work found numerous problems with
DOD’s processes for recording and reporting GWOT costs,
including long-standing deficiencies in DOD’s financial
management systems and business processes, the use of estimates
instead of actual cost data, and the lack of adequate supporting
documentation. As a result, neither DOD nor the Congress reliably
know how much the war is costing and how appropriated funds are
being used or have historical data useful in considering future
funding needs. GAO made several recommendations to improve the
reliability and reporting of GWOT costs. In addition to reported
costs for military operations, U.S. agencies have obligated about
$23 billion of $30 billion received for Iraqi reconstruction and
stabilization, as of January 2006.
U.S commitments to GWOT will likely involve the continued
investment of significant resources, requiring decision makers to
consider difficult trade-offs as the nation faces increasing fiscal
challenges in the years ahead; however, predicting future costs is
difficult as they depend on several direct and indirect cost
variables. For DOD, these include the extent and duration of
military operations, force redeployment plans, and the amount of
damaged or destroyed equipment needed to be repaired or replaced.
Future cost variables for other U.S. government agencies include
efforts to help form governments and build capable and loyal
security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and meet the healthcare
needs of veterans, including providing future disability payments
and medical services.
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