Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 17. April 2006 / Time Line April 17, 2006
Version 3.016. April 2006, 18. April 2006
04/17/2006
Bush's Latest Nuclear Gambit
By Lawrence S. Wittner
In 2005, U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, recognizing
that the Bush administration's favorite new nuclear weapon--the
"Bunker Buster"--was on the road to defeat in Congress, told its
leading antagonist, U.S. Representative David Hobson (R-Ohio): "You
may win this year, but we'll be back."
And, now, like malaria or perhaps merely a bad cold, they are.
The Bush administration's latest nuclear brainchild is the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW). According to an April 6, 2006 article in
the Los Angeles Times (Ralph Vartabedian, "U.S. Rolls Out Nuclear
Plan"), the RRW, originally depicted as an item that would update
existing nuclear weapons and ensure their reliability, "now
includes the potential for new bomb designs. Weapons labs currently
are engaged in design competition."
Moreover, as the Times story reported, the RRW was part of a much
larger Bush administration plan, announced the previous day, "for
the most sweeping realignment and modernization of the nation's
system of laboratories and factories for nuclear bombs since the
end of the Cold War." The plan called for a modern U.S. nuclear
complex that would design a new nuclear bomb and have it ready
within four years, as well as accelerate the production of
plutonium "pits," the triggers for the explosion of H-bombs.
Although administration officials justify the RRW by claiming that
it will guarantee the reliability of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile and reduce the need for nuclear testing, arms control and
disarmament advocates are quite critical of these claims. Citing
studies by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory researchers, they
argue that U.S. nuclear weapons will be reliable for decades longer
than U.S. officials contend. Furthermore, according to Hoover
Institution fellow Sidney Drell and former U.S. Ambassador James
Goodby: "It takes an extraordinary flight of imagination to
postulate a modern new arsenal composed of such untested designs
that would be more reliable, safe and effective than the current
U.S. arsenal based on more than 1,000 tests since 1945." Thus, if
new nuclear weapons were built, they would lead inevitably to the
resumption of U.S. nuclear testing and, thereby, to the collapse of
the moratorium on nuclear testing by the major nuclear powers and
to the final destruction of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Most worrisome for nuclear critics, however, is the prospect that
the administration will use the RRW program to develop new kinds of
nuclear weapons. Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms
Control Association, remains convinced that the replacement process
initiated by the RRW program could serve as a back door to such
development. Peace Action, the nation's largest peace and
disarmament organization, maintains that "the weapons labs and the
Department of Defense will be the ones to decide the real scope" of
the RRW program.
Even Representative Hobson, who seems to favor the RRW, appears
worried that the administration has a dangerously expansive vision
of it. "This is not an opportunity to run off and develop a whole
bunch of new capabilities and new weapons," he has declared. "This
is a way to redo the weapons capability that we have and maybe make
them more reliable." Hobson added: "I don't want any
misunderstandings . . . and sometimes within the [Energy]
department, people hear only what they want to hear. . . . We're
not going out and expanding a whole new world of nuclear
weapons."
Certainly, some degree of skepticism about the scope of the program
seems justified when one examines the Bush administration's overall
nuclear policy. Today, despite the U.S. government's commitment,
under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, to divest
itself of nuclear weapons through negotiated nuclear disarmament,
the U.S. nuclear stockpile stands at nearly 10,000 nuclear
warheads, with more than half of them active or operational.
Not only does the Bush administration steer clear of any
negotiations that might entail U.S. nuclear disarmament, but it has
pulled out of the ABM treaty and refused to support ratification of
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (negotiated and signed by former
President Bill Clinton). According to the Defense Department's
Quadrennial Defense Review Report of February 2006, "a robust
nuclear deterrent . . . remains a keystone of U.S. national
power."
Furthermore, there are clear signs that the Bush administration is
shifting away from the traditional U.S. strategy of nuclear
deterrence to a strategy of nuclear use. The nuclear Bunker Buster,
for example, was not designed to deter aggression, but to destroy
underground military targets. Moreover, in recent years, the U.S.
Strategic Command has added new missions to its war plans,
including the use of U.S. nuclear weapons for pre-emptive military
action. Seymour Hersh's much-cited article in the New Yorker on
preparations for a U.S. military attack upon Iran indicates that
there has already been substantial discussion of employing U.S.
nuclear weapons in that capacity.
This movement by the Bush administration toward a nuclear buildup
and nuclear war highlights the double standard it uses in its
growing confrontation with Iran, a country whose nuclear enrichment
program is in accordance with its NPT commitments. Of course, Iran
might use such nuclear enrichment to develop nuclear weapons--and
that would be a violation of the NPT. But Bush administration
policies already violate U.S. commitments under the treaty, and
this fact appears of far less concern to Washington officialdom.
Logic, however, does not seem to apply to this issue--unless, of
course, it is the logic of world power.
04/17/2006
CONTRACTS from the United States Department of Defense
Lockheed Martin, Space Systems Co., Sunnyvale, Calif., was awarded
on April 14, 2006 a $454,882,060 cost plus fixed fee, cost plus
award fee contract modification. This contract action is for the
implementation of the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF)
Satellite Communication System Program re-plan, which started in
late 2004. The re-plan was necessary due to delayed delivery of
government-furnished information assurance products, added payload
component testing, and replacement of critical parts that were
disqualified for space flight. The effort includes development of
emulators, additional testing associated with integrating multiple
incremental deliveries, and additional months of non-recurring
development. The resulting AEHF first launch date of April 2008 is
consistent with the revised Acquisition Program Baseline approved
in March 2005. At this time, $17,709,000 has been obligated. This
work will be complete May 2010. PA POC is Joseph Davidson, (310)
833-6428. Headquarters Space and Missile Systems Center, Los
Angeles, Calif., is the contracting activity.
(F04701-02-C-0002/P00136)
McDonnell Douglas, St. Louis, Mo., and Raytheon Co., Tucson, Ariz.,
is being awarded a $289,672,936 ($145,782,374 to McDonnell Douglas
& $143,890,562 to Raytheon) cost plus fixed fee contract. This
action provides for Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) Increment II,
42-month Risk Reduction Phase. The objective of the SDB II program
is to develop, test, and field a 250-lb class miniature munition
capable of destroying mobile/relocatable targets in adverse weather
from standoff ranges. SDB II is the next evolution of miniature
munition weapons development. The purpose of the Risk Reduction
phase is to define and validate a system concept that meets the
performance requirements outlined in the SDB II System Performance
Specification. At this time, $15,890,000 ($8,200,000 &
$7,690,000) has been obligated. Solicitations began December 2005
and negotiations were complete in March 2006. This work will be
complete October 2009. Headquarters Air-To-Ground Munitions Systems
Wing, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., is the contracting activity.
(FA8681-06-C-0151 & FA8681-06-C-0152)
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