Det danske Fredsakademi

Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 1. Juli 2005 / Time Line July 1, 2005

Version 3.0

Juni 2005, 2. Juli 2005


07/01/2005
Det er nu 26 måneder siden, at USA's præsident Bush erklærede krigen i Irak for vundet.

07/01/2005
NEWS RELEASE from the United States Department of Defense
The Department of Defense announced today the death of a soldier who was supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Sgt. Manny Hornedo, 27, of Brooklyn, N.Y., died June 28 in Tikrit, Iraq, where a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated near his HMMWV while conducting convoy operations. Hornedo was assigned to the Army National Guard's 1569th Transportation Company, New York, N.Y. DoD Announces Increase in Death Gratuity and SGLI
The Department of Defense announced today a significant increase in the death gratuity for the survivors of service members killed in action and the Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) coverage for service members deployed to designated combat zones.
The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief Act 2005 (Public Law 109-13) increases this immediate cash payment from $12,420 to $100,000 for survivors of those whose death is as a result of hostile actions and occurred in a designated combat operation or combat zone or while training for combat or performing hazardous duty.

07/01/2005
The Bush Butcher’s Bill: Officially, 72 US Military Deaths in Iraq from 2 through 25 May, 2005 - Official Total of 1,735 US Dead to date (and rising)
- http://www.tbrnews.org/Archives/a1622.htm
by Brian Harring, Domestic Intelligence Reporter
U.S. Military Personnel who died in German hospitals or en route to German hospitals have not previously been counted. They total about 6,210 as of 1 January, 2005. The ongoing, underreporting of the dead in Iraq, is not accurate. The DoD is deliberately reducing the figures. A review of many foreign news sites show that actual deaths are far higher than the newly reduced ones. Iraqi civilian casualties are never reported but International Red Cross, Red Crescent and UN figures indicate that as of 1 January 2005, the numbers are just under 100,000.
There is excellent reason to believe that the Department of Defense is deliberately not reporting a significant number of the dead in Iraq. We have received copies of manifests from the MATS that show far more bodies shipped into Dover AFP than are reported officially. The educated rumor is that the actual death toll is in excess of 7,000. Given the officially acknowledged number of over 15,000 seriously wounded, this elevated death toll is far more realistic than the current 1,400+ now being officially published. When our research is complete, and watertight, we will publish the results along with the sources In addition to the evident falsification of the death rolls, at least 5,500 American military personnel have deserted, most in Ireland but more have escaped to Canada and other European countries, none of whom are inclined to cooperate with vengeful American authorities. (See TBR News of 18 February for full coverage on the mass desertions) This means that of the 158,000 U.S. military shipped to Iraq, 26,000 either deserted, were killed or seriously wounded. The DoD lists currently being very quietly circulated indicate almost 9,000 dead, over 16,000 seriously wounded and a large number of suicides, forced hospitalization for ongoing drug usage and sales, murder of Iraqi civilians and fellow soldiers, rapes, courts martial and so on.

07/01/2005
Kvinder, fred og sikkerhed
Af: Forsvarsministeriet
Forsvaret sætter fokus på kvinders betydning for fred og sikkerhed.
Forsvaret går nu aktivt ind i implementeringen af FN-resolution 1325, der handler om kvinder, fred og sikkerhed.
Forsvaret vil undersøge, hvordan resolutionen kan overføres på forsvarets arbejdsmetoder. Det sker på baggrund af et fælles notat herom fra Forsvarsministeriet og Udenrigsministeriet til folketinget. Resultatet af undersøgelsen skal kunne implementeres i forsvarets arbejdsmetoder fra midten af 2006.
FN’s Sikkerhedsråd tager med resolutionen fat i kvinders særligt udsatte situation i væbnede konflikter. Rådet finder, at kvinders bidrag til konfliktforebyggelse, fredsbevarelse, konfliktløsning og fredsskabelse skal vægtes højere og udnyttes bedre, ligesom rådet understreger betydningen af, at kvinder anerkendes og benyttes som aktive og ligeværdige parter i bestræbelserne på at opnå fred og sikkerhed.
Resolutionen opfordrer medlemslandene til at inddrage kvinder mere i bestræbelserne på opnåelse af fred og sikkerhed i et konfliktområde.

07/01/2005
"Consultation is Presidential Business" : Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974
National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 159 - http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB159/index.htm
Washington D.C. July 1, 2005 - A decision to use nuclear weapons is one of the most politically, militarily, and morally perilous decisions that a U.S. president, or any leader of a nuclear state, can make. Recognizing that nuclear weapons differ from any other weapons because of their immense power and danger, President Lyndon B. Johnson once argued that a decision to use them "would lead us down an uncertain path of blows and counterblows whose outcome none may know." (Note 1) Johnson, like most U.S. presidents, sought strict controls over the weapons to minimize the risk of accidental or unauthorized use. That the use of nuclear weapons could precipitate a world conflagration has made leaders of allied nations, not least those with U.S. nuclear weapons stored on their territory, keenly interested in influencing how U.S. presidents would use them. This is especially but not uniquely true of British prime ministers. Since the early days of the Korean War, when the risk of world war loomed, prime ministers have sought a voice in any nuclear use decisions of U.S. presidents. The high priority of the "special relationship" with the United Kingdom made U.S. presidents responsive to British requests even though they raised significant political difficulties. The initiatives taken by British prime ministers and Washington's need to conciliate the closest of allies are documented in this briefing book on the record of U.K.-U.S. understandings on the nuclear use decision process. Among the disclosures in the briefing book:

  1. the written U.S.-U.K. understandings on nuclear weapons use from Eisenhower and Macmillan to Nixon and Heath
  2. the routine practice for the British to seek reaffirmations of the agreement whenever leadership changes occurred in London or Washington
  3. the strict emphasis on secrecy of the understandings to avoid pressure for agreements from European members of NATO
  4. the U.S. desire for loose understandings to avoid any limitations on "freedom of action."
  5. the 1965 agreement that consultations would extend to nuclear depth charges stored in the United Kingdom on behalf of a Netherlands anti-submarine warfare unit, although the Dutch would be kept in the dark about the basic UK-US understanding
  6. the extension of the understanding to U.S. nuclear depth bombs in Bermuda beginning in the 1970s
  7. parallel consultative arrangements with Canada, including more specific understandings on use of air defense nuclear weapons assigned to NORAD
  8. a related but less comprehensive understanding with the West German government begun during the late 1960s NATO's 1962 Athens Guidelines requiring U.S. consultations with the Alliance on nuclear use when time permitted it

07/01/2005
Labor Beat: Resolution 53: How the AFL-CIO Stood Up Against the War LB484.
- http://www.archive.org/details/CLALB484

07/01/2005

Top


Gå til Fredsakademiets forside
Tilbage til indholdsfortegnelsen for Juli 2005

Send kommentar, email eller søg i Fredsakademiet.dk