Det danske Fredsakademi
Kronologi over fredssagen og international politik 17. August
2005 / Timeline August 17, 2005
Version 3.5
16. August 2005, 18. August 2005
08/17/2005
The Pentagon's Bid to Militarize Space
By: Giuseppe Anzera
- http://www.pinr.com
A series of Pentagon initiatives aimed at space militarization and
at the creation of new types of armament -- capable of precisely
striking small targets in every corner of the world and to
neutralize most of today's anti-aircraft defenses -- will likely
result in a new power battlefield in the near future.
While the implementation of space weapons is likely to increase the
capability gap between Washington and other powers at first, a
broader vision reveals dangers involved in the move that could
affect U.S. interests, for it will likely trigger off determined
reactions by its competitors. Competitor states could successfully
deploy a small number of low cost orbital weapons, thus forcing the
U.S. to design an extremely expensive space defense system.
At the moment, a space weaponization policy may generate more
troubles than advantages for Washington.
Washington's Turn Toward Space Militarization
The Pentagon's plans to militarize space have definitely emerged.
In mid-May 2005, the U.S. Air Force formally asked President George
W. Bush to issue a presidential directive that allows Washington to
deploy defensive and offensive weapons into orbit. Formally, the
new directive is necessary to replace a precedent decree
(PDD-NSC-49 -- National Space Policy) issued by the Clinton
administration which forbids the indiscriminate militarization of
space. While the decree has not yet been issued, speculations over
the Pentagon's move already hit the news.
After the 2002 unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty, worries were raised about Washington's possible
start of such a program, for it could transform space into a new
battlefield. The U.S. Air Force request, coupled with the April
2005 launch of the XSS-11 orbital micro-satellite, increased the
concerns of observers and world powers. XSS-11 is in fact
specifically designed to disturb other states'
military/reconnaissance or communication satellites.
A discontinuance of U.S. traditional policy about the restricted
(e.g. peaceful) use of space could engender a new arms race --
which appears economically and technologically challenging and way
beyond many states' reach.
Global Strike and Rods from God
On the technological level, the Pentagon's planning is in the
advanced stage: some projects -- aimed at space weaponization --
have already been in place for some time. Among the (partially
known) Pentagon's new plans, the two most interesting projects are
the "Global Strike" program and the "Rods from God" program. Global
Strike involves the employment of military space planes capable of
carrying about 500 kg (1100 lbs) of high-precision weapons (with a
circular error probability less than 3 meters) with the primary use
of striking enemy military bases and command and control facilities
in any point of the world.
The main strength of military space planes is the ability to reach
any spot on the globe within 45 minutes. This is a short period of
time that could provide U.S. forces with a formidable quick
reaction capability, as opposed to the enemy's subsequent inability
to organize any effective defense. Such a weapon's primary target
would be the enemy's strategic forces and -- according to U.S. Air
Force sources widely quoted in the press -- the Pentagon is
inclined to give priority to this project. One of the main reasons,
these sources say, is that the Pentagon itself -- after spending
over US$100 billion -- has finally admitted its failure to create
an infallible earth-based anti-missile system to protect the
American soil from ballistic strikes.
The U.S. Air Force often underscores the space plane's wide
operational spectrum. In fact, its utilization encompasses that of
a strategic weapon as well as that of its defensive uses of
neutralizing nuclear missiles; it would have the ability to target
and eliminate militant and terrorist leaders. The space plane could
also be employed to suppress long-range air defenses, thanks to its
high mobility, hyper-fast deployment and its immunity from the
defenses of its opponents. Other uses could be envisaged in the
Integrated Air Defense System, as well as surveillance tasks.
Moreover, space planes could be easily deployed to support the U.S.
Army's rapid reaction force and units of Marines during power
projection operations and redeployment phases.
"Rods from God" is the evolution of a 1980s program. Basically, it
consists of orbiting platforms stocked with metal tungsten rods
around 6.1 meters long (20 feet) and 30 cm (one foot) in diameter
that could be satellite-guided to targets anywhere on the earth
within minutes, for the rods would move at over 11,000 km/hr (6,835
mph). This weapon exploits kinetic energy to cause an explosion the
same magnitude of that of an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon, but
with no radioactive fall-out. The system would function due to two
satellites, one of which would work as a communications platform,
while the other would contain an arsenal of tungsten rods. Each of
the satellites would be seven meters long (23 feet) and its
diameter would be approximately 30 cm (one foot).
However, serious problems would arise if the Pentagon begins the
operational phase -- especially from a financial perspective. Some
studies maintain that Rods from God could be fully operational in
ten years. The targets of the rods would be much more restricted
than those of Global Strike. Their main targets remains ballistic
missiles stockpiled in hardened sites, or orbital devices and
satellite systems deployed by other powers -- according to the
counter-space operation doctrine. Rods from God can, however, be
employed to strike targets in desert areas -- be they hardened
sites or concentrated hostile forces.
Its devastating striking power does not allow such a weapon to be
used for other missions, if unsustainable collateral damage is to
be avoided.
Other projects -- which often look like a revisited version of
former U.S. President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense
Initiative's (S.D.I.) programs -- could also be undertaken, such as
space mirrors satellites redirecting laser beams from earth against
any orbit or surface target and satellites that send out radio
waves with a high range in power and breadth.
Problems
The White House will face several problems if it wants to pursue
the ambitious project of space militarization consisting of both
offensive and defensive weapons.
The first point is the political issue. International reactions to
U.S. plans have already appeared: Russian Defense Minister Sergei
Ivanov recently evoked an immediate reaction from Moscow, and
serious consequences were threatened should an orbital weapon
deployment be performed by Washington. Such a reaction could
consist of a modified version of the SS-18 intercontinental
ballistic missile, capable of putting into orbit a remarkable
quantity of space vehicles -- which could even carry military
nukes, thus making the U.S. planned intercepting effort much more
difficult.
It is easy to imagine that space weaponization -- once in place --
could be employed as well by U.S. rivals at any occasion, as these
latter will develop mutual strategic ties just like China and
Russia are doing in Central Asia.
The second problem is economic. Orbital weapons -- as the Strategic
Defense Initiative showed in the 1980s -- are extremely expensive.
It has been estimated that a space defense system against weak
ballistic missile strikes could cost between US$220 billion and
US$1 trillion. A laser-based system to be used against ballistic
missiles would cost about US$100 million for each target.
For instance, the Future Imagery Architecture -- a project aimed at
the implementation of new spy satellites which are vital to
identify targets for space weapons -- has already reached a cost of
US$25 billion. It is a legitimate question, therefore, of whether
Washington really needs to finance such projects in today's
geostrategic context. Moreover, would these tools be cost-effective
in relation of their real operational capability? The first
question raises doubts and the second one remains, at the moment,
without answer. Henceforth, such initiatives resemble more and more
Reagan's S.D.I.
The third fundamental problem is of strategic nature. The
implications of space militarization are enormous, and its
consequences can't be predicted. It is certain that -- in the short
term -- U.S. financial and technological superiority would increase
the already prominent gap in military power between Washington and
the rest of the world. In addition, some of the new weapons could
give the White House new effective tools to fight against
symmetrical (states) and asymmetrical (terror networks) threats.
However, in the long run, a military colonization of outer space
could very well be started by other powers -- which would hardly
tolerate Washington's quasi-private use of space.
The Clinton administration decided to take the opposite route and
avoided international space militarization, as it considered a new
front useless because of the U.S. military's overwhelming dominance
on land, sea and air.
Moreover, the orbital deployment of offensive weapons -- even
though unequivocally non-nuclear -- can be perilous for various
reasons. First of all, the U.S. is currently obligated not to
deploy atomic or W.M.D. space weapons, as it signed the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty. Even if Rods of God is not a nuclear weapon, its
impact power is near the magnitude of a nuke. Hence, it is not
certain that the international community will consider it a
conventional weapon, and a violation of the treaty could,
therefore, be claimed. As a consequence, an indiscriminate race to
space weaponization could begin -- involving the orbital deployment
of W.M.D. and nuclear weapons. This latter scenario could result in
a problem for the United States, a problem that its decision-makers
in the 1960s strived to avoid at any cost.
Second, political consequences of a quasi-nuclear weapon should not
be overlooked. If Rods of God will be used and other powers will
perceive it as the equivalent of a nuclear strike, many states
could change their perception of W.M.D. and nuclear weapons
standards. A stark decrease in the traditional refrain from using
nuclear bombs could then occur, thus changing the current strategy
behind nuclear weapons: that of deterrence tools.
Conclusion
The road to space weaponization is hazardous. The current U.S.
administration appears confident that it can handle the issue
successfully. As usual, when a new category of weapons sees the
light, it is not clear whether newcomers will suffer from perpetual
disadvantage.
If other powers succeed in implementing low-cost orbital
instruments that could endanger Washington's sophisticated space
weapons, the U.S. could rapidly find itself in need of financing
hyper-expensive programs designed to protect the country -- a
situation which could make the Pentagon regret having opened the
space front to begin with.
08/17/2005
State Department experts warned CENTCOM before Iraq war about
lack of plans for post-war Iraq security
Planning for post-Saddam regime change began as early as October
2001
National Security Archive Update, August 17, 2005
http://www.nsarchive.org
Washington, D.C., August 17, 2005: Newly declassified State
Department documents show that government experts warned the U.S.
Central Command (CENTCOM) in early 2003 about "serious planning
gaps for post-conflict public security and humanitarian
assistance," well before Operation Iraqi Freedom began.
In a February 7, 2003, memo to Under Secretary of State Paula
Dobriansky, three senior Department officials noted CENTCOM's
"focus on its primary military objectives and its reluctance to
take on 'policing' roles," but warned that "a failure to address
short-term public security and humanitarian assistance concerns
could result in serious human rights abuses which would undermine
an otherwise successful military campaign, and our reputation
internationally." The memo adds "We have raised these issues with
top CENTCOM officials."
By contrast, a December 2003 report to Congress, also released by
the State Department, offers a relatively rosy picture of the
security situation, saying U.S. forces are "increasingly successful
in preventing planned hostile attacks; and in capturing former
regime loyalists, would-be terrorists and planners; and seizing
weapons caches." The document acknowledges that "Challenges
remain."
Since then, 1,393 U.S. military fatalities have been recorded in
Iraq, including two on the day the report went to Congress.
The new documents, released this month to the National Security
Archive under the Freedom of Information Act, also provide more
evidence on when the Bush administration began planning for regime
change in Iraq -- as early as October 2001.
The declassified records relate mainly to the so-called "Future of
Iraq Project," an effort, initially run by the State Department
then by the Pentagon, to plan for the transition to a new regime
after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003. They provide detail
on each of the working groups and give the starting date for
planning as October 2001.
Entire sections of a Powerpoint presentation the State Department
prepared on November 1, 2002 -- including those covering "What We
Have Learned So Far" and "Implications for the Real Future of Iraq"
-- have been censored as still-classified information.
08/17/2005
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