TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
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In the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems the United States and the Soviet Union agree that each may
have only two ABM deployment areas,1 so restricted and
so located that they cannot provide a nationwide ABM defense or
become the basis for developing one. Each country thus leaves
unchallenged the penetration capability of the others retaliatory
missile forces.
The Treaty permits each side to have one limited ABM system to
protect its capital and another to protect an ICBM launch area. The
two sites defended must be at least 1,300 kilometers apart, to
prevent the creation of any effective regional defense zone or the
beginnings of a nationwide system.
Precise quantitative and qualitative limits are imposed on the
ABM systems that may be deployed. At each site there may be no more
than 100 interceptor missiles and 100 launchers. Agreement on the
number and characteristics of radars to be permitted had required
extensive and complex technical negotiations, and the provisions
governing these important components of ABM systems are spelled out
in very specific detail in the Treaty and further clarified in the
"Agreed Statements" accompanying it.
Both Parties agreed to limit qualitative improvement of their
ABM technology, e.g., not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers
capable of launching more than one interceptor missile at a time or
modify existing launchers to give them this capability, and systems
for rapid reload of launchers are similarly barred. These
provisions, the Agreed Statements clarify, also ban interceptor
missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.
There had been some concern over the possibility that
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) intended for defense against
aircraft might be improved, along with their supporting radars, to
the point where they could effectively be used against ICBMs and
SLBMs, and the Treaty prohibits this. While further deployment of
radars intended to give early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack is not prohibited, such radars must be located along
the territorial boundaries of each country and oriented outward, so
that they do not contribute to an effective ABM defense of points
in the interior.
Further, to decrease the pressures of technological change and
its unsettling impact on the strategic balance, both sides agree to
prohibit development, testing, or deployment of sea-based,
air-based, or space-based ABM systems and their components, along
with mobile land-based ABM systems. Should future technology bring
forth new ABM systems "based on other physical principles" than
those employed in current systems, it was agreed that limiting such
systems would be discussed, in accordance with the Treatys
provisions for consultation and amendment.
The Treaty also provides for a U.S.-Soviet Standing
Consultative Commission to promote its objectives and
implementation. The commission was established during the first
negotiating session of SALT II, by a Memorandum of Understanding
dated December 21, 1972. Since then both the United States and the
Soviet Union have raised a number of questions in the Commission
relating to each sides compliance with the SALT I agreements. In
each case raised by the United States, the Soviet activity in
question has either ceased or additional information has allayed
U.S. concern.
Article XIV of the Treaty calls for review of the Treaty five
years after its entry into force, and at five-year intervals
thereafter. The first such review was conducted by the Standing
Consultative Commission at its special session in the fall of 1977.
At this session, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that
the Treaty had operated effectively during its first five years,
that it had continued to serve national security interests, and
that it did not need to be amended at that time.
The most recent Treaty review was completed in October 1993.
Following that review, numerous sessions of the Standing
Consultative Commission have been held to work out Treaty
succession -- to "multilateralize" the Treaty -- as a result of the
break-up of the Soviet Union and to negotiate a demarcation between
ABM and non-ABM systems.
__________________
1 Subsequently reduced to one area (See section on
ABM Protocol)
TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE
LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS
Signed at Moscow May 26, 1972
Ratification advised by U.S. Senate August 3, 1972
Ratified by U.S. President September 30, 1972
Proclaimed by U.S. President October 3, 1972
Instruments of ratification exchanged October 3, 1972
Entered into force October 3, 1972
- The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
- Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have
devastating consequences for all mankind,
- Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic
missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race
in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the
risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,
- Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of
anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures
with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would
contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further
negotiations on limiting strategic arms,
- Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
- Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible
date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective
measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarma-ment,
and general and complete disarmament,
- Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international
tension and the strengthening of trust between States,
- Have agreed as follows:
Article I
- 1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the
provisions of this Treaty.
- 2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a
defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base
for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an
individual region except as provided for in Article III of this
Treaty.
Article II
- 1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which
are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role,
or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed
for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for
an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.
- 2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this
Article include those which are:
(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.
Article III
- Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their
components except that:
(a) within one ABM system deployment
area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and
centered on the Partys national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no
more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred
ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within
no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex
being circular and having a diameter of no more than three
kilometers; and
(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of
one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo
launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM
launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at
launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in
potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under
construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM
system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no
more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the
potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large
phased-array ABM radars.
Article IV
- The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to
ABM systems or their components used for development or testing,
and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each
Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at
test ranges.
Article V
- 1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM
systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based,
or mobile land-based.
- 2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM
launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a
time from each launcher, not to modify deployed launchers to
provide them with such a capacity, not to develop, test, or deploy
automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid
reload of ABM launchers.
Article VI
- To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on
ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty, each Party
undertakes:
(a) not to give missiles, launchers,
or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or
ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM
mode; and
(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of
strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the
periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.
Article VII
- Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and
replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried
out.
Article VIII
- ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or
outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems
or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed
or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible
agreed period of time.
Article IX
- To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each
Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy
outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components
limited by this Treaty.
Article X
- Each Party undertakes not to assume any international
obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.
Article XI
- The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for
limitations on strategic offensive arms.
Article XII
- 1. For the purpose of providing assurance or compliance with
the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of international
law.
- 2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national
technical means of verification of the other Party operating in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
- 3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment
measures which impede verification by national technical means of
compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation
shall not require changes in current construction, assembly,
conversion, or overhaul practices.
Article XIII
- 1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a
Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which
they will:
(a) consider questions concerning
compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations
which may be considered ambiguous;
(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either
Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with
the obligations assumed;
(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with
national technical means of verification;
(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which
have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;
(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or
dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided
for by the provisions of this Treaty;
(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further
increasing the viability of this Treaty; including proposals for
amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;
(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures
aimed at limiting strategic arms.
- 2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may
amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative
Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant
matters.
Article XIV
- 1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed
amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures
governing the entry into force of this Treaty.
- 2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at
five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct
a review of this Treaty.
Article XV
- 1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
- 2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty,
have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its
decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the
Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary
events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its
supreme interests.
Article XVI
- 1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance
with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall
enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of
ratification.
- 2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
- DONE at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in
the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally
authentic.
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States of America
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
L. I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU